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THE EQUAL PROTECTION COMPONENT OF
LEGISLATIVE GENERALITY
Evan C. Zoldan *
INTRODUCTION
The goal of achieving equality under law is deeply rooted in
American philosophical traditions and constitutional doctrine.
And although there is no universally accepted definition of equal-
ity, some applications of the principle are uncontroversial; most
conceptions of equality bristle at the notion of particularized leg-
islative treatment of named individuals without adequate justifi-
cation.
Consider the following example: a well-connected man, a high-
ranking government official no less, dies. He truly is part of the
"one percent," worth $50 million at his death. In its next Continu-
ing Appropriations Act, between provisions about public health
and veterans, Congress inserts a section transferring nearly
$200,000 to the deceased millionaire's widow. The public owes no
preexisting legal or financial obligation to the man or his widow:
the transfer is neither a pension nor a life insurance payout. Ra-
ther, it is a mere gratuity. But, little attention is paid to this pro-
vision and it is passed by both chambers of Congress and signed
into law by the President. A gratuitous transfer of this kind, of
public wealth to a named individual, singles out a particular per-
son for a special benefit that is not available to the population
generally. This statute offends widely held conceptions of equality
* Associate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law. My thanks for the invalua-
ble comments and suggestions of Akhil Reed Amar, Jack M. Balkin, Victoria F. Nourse,
Richard Briffault, Peter D. Enrich, Eric Berger, Gregory M. Gilchrist, Ganesh Sitaraman,
Rebecca E. Zietlow, and Kirsten Matoy Carlson. I am grateful for the comments from par-
ticipants in the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum, the Legislation Roundtable
at Cardozo Law School, the Association of American Law Schools New Voices in Legisla-
tion Workshop, Loyola University Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium, Central States
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because it accords the official's widow a benefit without reference
to any service that she provided to the community-and what is
perhaps worse-simply because of her family connections.
As this example suggests, a statute that singles out a known
individual for special treatment, called special legislation, can of-
fend a number of plausible conceptions of equality. By treating
like cases in an unlike manner, special legislation often offends
the notion of formal equality. By perpetuating social stratification
and reinforcing social hierarchy, special legislation often offends
substantive conceptions of equality as well. But, despite the fact
that it offends widely held visions of equality, special legislation
is enacted every year by Congress and state legislatures. Through
special laws, legislatures provide benefits, like transfers of wealth
or exemptions from the standing laws, to named individuals; leg-
islatures also use special laws to impose legal or economic bur-
dens on particular individuals.' Indeed, the above example is no
hypothetical. Congress made just such a transfer of wealth to
Bonnie Englebardt Lautenberg following the death of her hus-
band, the former Senator from New Jersey.2
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere with special
legislation. In all except the most egregious cases, pecial legisla-
tion has evaded judicial review. And perhaps surprisingly, the
Court has been unwilling even to evaluate special legislation un-
der the Equal Protection Clause, the constitutional provision
most specifically directed toward the enforcement of equality.
This anomalous situation raises a number of difficult questions:
why does the Court fail to restrain such a significant source of in-
equality through the Equal Protection Clause? Should the Clause
be read to restrain special legislation? Must the inequality creat-
ed by special legislation go unchecked? These questions and their
answers are the subject of this article. Although special legisla-
tion offends a number of widely held visions of enforceable equali-
ty, the Equal Protection Clause is incapable, on its own, of re-
straining it. And although the Equal Protection Clause ultimately
cannot restrain special legislation, analyzing the Clause's doctri-
1. E.g., Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3,
119 Stat. 15, 15-16 (2005); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591 (1983) (finding that a state tax law "target[ed] a small group of
newspapers"); MARGARET MIKYUNG LEE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33024, PRIVATE
IMMIGRATION LEGISLATION 2 (2005) (describing private immigration bills).
2. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013) (transferring $174,000 to named individual).
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nal commitments and conceptual moorings reveals its connection
to a number of other constitutional clauses and principles that
are also offended by special legislation. Together, these clauses
and principles suggest that there is a principle of constitutional
dimension that should restrain special legislation. This princi-
ple-which may be called a value of legislative generality--can
help perfect our commitment to equality by restraining special
legislation.
This article is part of a long-term project that describes and de-
fines the parameters of a constitutional value of legislative gen-
erality. This multistage project involves a deep exploration of
each of the clauses of the Constitution, and other constitutional
principles, that reflect a component of the value of legislative
generality. The Equal Protection Clause, which is the subject of
this article, is one of these clauses; others include the Bill of At-
tainder,3 Ex Post Facto,4 Contract,' Appointments,6 Due Process,7
Takings,8 and General Welfare9 clauses, as well as the Klein rule
of decision principle. ° Of course, none of these provisions are ex-
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437, 441-42 (1965).
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Charles B. Hochman, The Su-
preme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692,
693 (1960).
5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light
Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412 n.13 (1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S.
234, 247-48, 248 n.20 (1978)).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 314-15 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) [hereinafter FARRAND].
7. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court has recognized that "the sovereign may not take
the property of A for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even
though A is paid just compensation." Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005)
(emphasis omitted). This principle was earlier reflected in due process doctrine, which ex-
plained that the liberty component of due process is violated by "taking the property of A
and giving it to B." JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 52-53 (2003).
This component of due process ultimately was subsumed by the more amorphous concept
of substantive due process. Id. at 73-74. When robust enforcement of substantive due pro-
cess died along with the Lochner era, the concept that there was something wrong with
"taking the property of A and giving it to B" as a stand-alone principle was interred with
its bones. Id. at 53, 70, 73-74. Shadows of this principle survive in Administrative Law,
which continues to recognize a distinction between rules of general applicability and rules
that apply only to a few, known individuals. See Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equal-
ization of Colo., 239 U.S. 441, 444-45 (1915); Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S.
373, 375 (1908).
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. The Court has suggested that appropriations must be
limited to expenditures designed "to provide for the general welfare"; nevertheless, it has
consigned the "general welfare" determination to Congress's discretion so long as Congress
has not exercised "arbitrary power." Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 632, 640 (1937).
10. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 144-47 (1871) (explaining that
2017]
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clusively about generality in law; and none of them, standing
alone, is sufficient to impose a comprehensive and coherent value
of legislative generality. But, each of these provisions and princi-
ples contributes to the value of legislative generality because each
contains a component that disfavors particularized legislation.
For example, because the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents the
legislature from passing a law imposing punishment on a named
individual, it can be viewed as a guarantee of judicial process."
However, the Bill of Attainder Clause also can be viewed as a
substantive limitation on the power of the legislature to single
out a named individual for a burden that is not borne by the rest
of the population. Similarly, the Klein rule of decision principle
stands for the proposition that Congress may not direct a court to
rule for a particular party in a pending case.2 This provision is
normally viewed as supporting the principle of separation of pow-
ers by preserving the independence of the judiciary. However,
from another perspective, Klein prevents the legislature from sin-
gling out one individual to win a particular case (and another in-
dividual from losing that same case). In this way, each of the
above-noted clauses and principles contains a component that re-
inforces legislative generality, either because of the effect given to
it by the Court, its place in the constitutional structure, or the
historical experiences that gave rise to its inclusion in the Consti-
tution. The project of articulating a value of legislative generality,
therefore, is one of uncovering the commonality among these
seemingly unrelated constitutional clauses and principles, and
reading each to give meaning to the principle that they share.
My prior work introduced the concept of legislative generality
and argued that it should be enforced as a stand-alone constitu-
tional principle. A constitutional value of legislative generality
rests on three pillars-philosophy, history, and text. First, jurists
and philosophers of law have long articulated a value of legisla-
tive generality. Second, the history of the revolutionary period
leading up to the framing of the Constitution suggests that a key
Congress may not deny federal courts jurisdiction "founded solely on the application of a
rule of decision, in causes pending"). Recently, the Court has read Klein narrowly, under-
mining its ability to support a constitutional value of legislative generality. See Evan C.
Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of Legislative Generality, 35 YALE L. &
POL'Y REV. INTER ALiA 1, 3-4 (2016).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 316 (1946)
(explaining that the Bill of Attainder Clause prevents a finding of guilt without judicial
trial).
12. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 146-47.
[Vol. 51:489
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purpose of the Constitution was to address evils associated with
special legislation. Third, the text and structure of the Constitu-
tion delineate a norm of legislative generality. Together, these
pillars suggest that a value of legislative generality should be en-
forced as a constitutional principle and that current constitution-
al doctrine should be modified to give effect to this principle.3
This article advances the broad project outlined above by rec-
ognizing the equal protection component of legislative generality.
Exploring the relationship between the Equal Protection Clause
and the value of legislative generality both enhances an under-
standing of the proper bounds of the Equal Protection Clause and
helps define the ultimate parameters of a value of legislative gen-
erality. Part I of this article defines and provides paradigmatic
examples of special legislation. Part II identifies the most widely
held conceptions of equality that can be enforced through the
Equal Protection Clause and describes how special legislation of-
fends these conceptions. Part III describes how the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, despite its powerful ability to enforce differing vi-
sions of equality, is incapable, on its own, of combatting special
legislation. Part IV introduces the principle of legislative general-
ity as a coherent mechanism for restraining special legislation. It
concludes by drawing on equal protection doctrine and theory to
help fashion a coherent and meaningful value of legislative gen-
erality.
My future work will further explore legislative generality as an
independent constitutional principle that can limit special legisla-
tion. This work will explore the other clauses of the Constitution
and constitutional principles that suggest the existence of a con-
stitutional value of legislative generality. If enforced as an inde-
pendent constitutional principle, the value of legislative generali-
ty can serve an important role in eliminating the unchecked
harms caused by special legislation that each of these clauses and
principles, standing alone, cannot address.
I. SPECIAL LEGISLATION DEFINED AND DESCRIBED
Through a combination of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
13. Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 650-60
(2014) [hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality].
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Clause, both the federal government14 and the states15 are prohib-
ited from denying any person equal protection of the laws. The
Supreme Court has interpreted this protection broadly, rendering
the Equal Protection Clause a powerful and flexible tool for pro-
tecting individual rights against government overreach. The
Court's interpretation of this Clause has been the subject of criti-
cism, to be sure."s Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the Equal
Protection Clause has come to embody the American constitu-
tional ideal of equality."
But despite the breadth of the Equal Protection Clause, and
the commitment to the ideal of equality that it represents, legis-
latures often enact statutes that target an individual or small,
identifiable group for treatment that is not applied to the general
population. This type of legislation, often called special legisla-
tion, presents a fundamental challenge to equality by imposing
paradigmatically unequal treatment without adequate justifica-
tion. This part defines and describes special legislation; Part II
describes how special legislation offends a number of plausible vi-
sions of equality.
A. Special Legislation Defined
Both state legislatures and Congress enact statutes that target
individuals or small, identifiable groups for treatment that is not
imposed on the general population. This category of particular-
ized legislation is often referred to as "special legislation,"'8 alt-
14. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347
U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
15. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from denying "to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16. See, e.g., Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than
Race" The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 673-81 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92
MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2424 (1994).
17. ROBERT J. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY: THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS AND
THE SUPREME COURT 5 (1960); Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 747, 748-50 (2011) [hereinafter Yoshino, The New Equal Protection].
18. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT.
291, 315 (2007) [hereinafter Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning] ('[S]pecial' or 'par-
tial' legislation" includes legislation that "pick[s] out a group for special benefits or special
burdens."); Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Local, Private, and Special Legislation in
the Nineteenth-Century United States, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 271, 271 (2004) (explaining
that special legislation includes both "local and private legislation" and is distinguished
from "general legislation"); Dale F. Rubin, Public Aid to Professional Sports Teams-A
Constitutional Disgrace. The Battle to Revive Judicial Rulings and State Constitutional
[Vol. 51:489
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hough there is no precise definition of the term. The primary di-
lemma encountered when defining "special legislation" is deter-
mining how small a group must be before it should be considered
special.
The paradigm of special legislation is a law that targets a sin-
gle individual; this type of statute has long been distinguished
from generally applicable laws by legal philosophers and jurists.
Locke argued that the legislative power does not include the pow-
er to vary the standing, generally applicable laws "in particular
cases."'9 Similarly, Blackstone described that the concept of "law"
properly includes only rules that are "permanent, uniform, and
universal."2 By contrast, an order concerning "a particular per-
son" that "has no relation to the community in general. .. is ra-
ther a sentence than a law."21 Moreover, there is a strain of Su-
preme Court doctrine, particularly from the early days of the
republic, that emphasizes the difference between laws that target
individuals and generally applicable laws. In Fletcher v. Peck, the
Court considered whether an act nullifying the transfer of a par-
ticular parcel of land is a legislative act permitted by the Consti-
tution." Chief Justice Marshall answered in the negative: "[i]t is
the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules
for the government of society; the application of those rules to in-
dividuals in society would seem to be the duty of other depart-
ments."" This fundamental principle was restated in Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward, in which the Court agreed with
Daniel Webster's argument that "acts of the legislature, which af-
fect only particular persons and their particular privileges" are
"not the exercise of a power properly legislative."24 The Court con-
trasted "general laws" setting out terms on which a marriage may
be dissolved, which are not prohibited by the Constitution, from
Enactments Prohibiting Public Subsidies to Private Corporations, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 393,
399 (1999) (defining special legislation as "laws... made applicable to a particular person,
group or thing within a specified class, which are not applicable to the entire class");
Comment, The Constitutionality of Private Acts of Congress, 49 YALE L.J. 712, 712 n.1
(1940) (explaining that special legislation includes legislation applying to "only one or a
few determinable individuals").
19. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT chap. XI, § 142 (C.B. Macpher-
son ed., 1980).
20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *44.
21. Id.
22. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810).
23. Id. (emphasis added).
24. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 558, 580 (1819).
20171
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the legislative dissolution of a particular marriage, which "en-
trench[es] upon the prohibition of the constitution.25
These jurists and philosophers of law described the difference
between a statute that targets an individual-which is not an ap-
propriate action for the legislature-and a law that is generally
applicable. But, generality lies along a spectrum: legislation
sometimes neither targets an individual nor applies to the popu-
lation in general, but rather singles out a small, identifiable
group, placing it between these two conceptual poles. For exam-
ple, Congress and state legislatures have enacted statutes that
exempt a particular husband and wife from the general laws,"
grant a special benefit to four named members of the same fami-
ly,27 and impose a tax applicable to a small group of-perhaps
two-publishers.28 There are good reasons to include at least some
of these in-between statutes in the definition of "special legisla-
tion." After all, a statute that singles out a small, determinable
group raises many of the same concerns-like favoritism, animus,
or encroachment on the judicial function-that attend individual-
ized legislation.
Whether targeted laws of this scope should be considered "spe-
cial" is a difficult question and probably explains the modern Su-
preme Court's reluctance to give effect to a principle that disfa-
vors legislative specification.29 For present purposes, however, we
can draw some initial conclusions: because of the jurisprudential
and doctrinal distinction between general laws and laws that sin-
gle out individuals, special legislation must, at least, include a
statute that singles out a particular individual. Moreover, be-
cause of the similarities between individualized statutes and
statutes that single out very small groups, like the ones noted
above, special legislation may ultimately be defined to include
groups of this size as well." Without finally defining the scope of
25. Id. at 695-96.
26. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15 (2005).
27. Priv. L. No. 106-20, 114 Stat. 3118 (2000).
28. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591
n.15 (1983).
29. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1327 (2016); Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995); Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra
note 13, at 643-47.
30. An extension of the definition of special laws to include statutes that describe en-
tire families is warranted by the Corruption of Blood and Forfeiture Clause and Title of
Nobility Clauses. The former prohibits family-based collective punishment and the latter
[Vol. 51:489
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special legislation, therefore, this article includes statutes that
single out groups of two to five, as well as individualized laws, as
examples of special legislation. The contours of a value of legisla-
tive generality-including the extent to which it restricts legisla-
tion that targets a small identifiable group-is a question that
cannot be resolved until the constitutional clauses and principles
that make up the value have been fully considered.
B. Paradigmatic Examples of Special Legislation
Special laws touch on a wide variety of substantive subject
matters, including public spending, immigration, and taxation, to
name a few. Special legislation can provide benefits or impose
burdens and can be considered either civil or criminal in nature.
Although special legislation as a category of law rarely is the sub-
ject of scholarly inquiry, individual examples of special legislation
are often well-publicized,3' roundly criticized,32 and ubiquitous;
indeed, special legislation is enacted in every term of Congress33
and every year by state legislatures. In order to appreciate the
challenge presented by special legislation to the value of equality,
it is important to understand the wide variety of special laws that
are enacted. The following are just a few of the many special laws
that Congress and state legislatures routinely enact and are rep-
resentative of the phenomenon of special legislation.
prohibit family-based collective reward. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10; id. art.
III, § 3, cl. 2. Together, they suggest that the Constitution's concern with specificity ex-
tends to identifiable families as well as identifiable individuals.
31. See, e.g., Rafael Lorente, Congress Turning its Focus to Life Issues, Schiavo Efforts
May Be Sign of Future Battles, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Mar. 25, 2005, at 1lA.
32. CHARLES CHAUNCEY BINNEY, RESTRICTIONS UPON LOCAL AND SPECIAL
LEGISLATION IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 6 (1894) (explaining that special laws enacted by
the states "were often pushed through the legislatures by unscrupulous men, to the sacri-
fice of public interests"); Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1684, 1700
(1966) (explaining that, in the context of private immigration litigation, a bill that favors
one petitioner "acts to the detriment of others who may be equally deserving").
33. See, e.g., Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127
Stat. 558, 565 (2013); Priv. L. No. 112-1 (2012); Betty Dick Residence Protection Act of
2006, Priv. L. No. 109-1, 120 Stat. 3705 (2006); Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa
Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
34. See, e.g., City of DeSoto v. Nixon, 476 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Mo. 2016); Okla. Coal. for
Reprod. Justice v. Cline, 368 P.3d 1278, 1288 (Okla. 2016); Moline Sch. Dist. No. 40 Bd. of
Educ. v. Quinn, 54 N.E.3d 825, 833 (Ill. 2016). Unlike the Federal Constitution, many
state constitutions have specific provisions limiting the use of special laws. However, state
special legislation has persisted despite these state constitutional provisions because they
tend to be weakly enforced and are riddled with exceptions. The effect of state constitu-
tional restrictions on special laws is an important topic but beyond the scope of this arti-
cle.
2017]
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1. Special Transfers of Public Property
Special laws often transfer public property to a named individ-
ual, like a former government employee15 or member of his imme-
diate family.3" Because there is a mechanism for individuals with
claims against the government to recover funds that are owed to
them,3" transfers of wealth made by Congress are gratuitous; that
is, they are made to individuals to whom no legal obligation is
owed.38 In a recent example of a special grant of public wealth,
Congress provided a gratuitous payment of $174,000 to Bonnie
Englebardt Lautenberg, the widow of the late United States Sen-
ator Frank Lautenberg." The special law transferring this money
does not reflect any legal or financial obligation owed to Mrs.
Lautenberg. Rather, it was made as part of Congress' routine
practice of giving money to the surviving spouses of deceased
members." Nor was this money given to Lautenberg because she
was in any financial need: she was already a millionaire prior to
this wealth transfer.41
2. Special Exemptions From Standing Laws
Another common type of special law is an exemption for a
named individual from the generally applicable laws. One high
profile, but far from unique, example of a special exemption law
was the statute enacted to resolve the fate of Terri Schiavo. An
ongoing legal dispute between Schiavo's parents and husband
over whether to withdraw her life support resulted in a court or-
der requiring the hospice facility in which she resided to withhold
food and water, permitting her to die.42 In response, Congress en-
acted a statute entitled "For the Relief of the Parents of Theresa
35. Priv. L. No. 107-3, 116 Stat. 3121 (2002); Priv. L. No. 107-4, 116 Stat. 3122 (2002).
36. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013).
37. Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012).
38. R. ERIC PETERSEN & JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34347,
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS WHO DIE IN OFFICE: HISTORIC AND CURRENT PRACTICES 12-14
(2012).
39. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013).
40. PETERSEN & MANNING, supra note 38, at 12-14; Gregory Korte, Spending Bill
Gives $174,000 to Millionaire Senator's Widow, USA TODAY (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/09/26/frank-lautenberg-widow-payment/2877049/.
41. Korte, supra note 40.
42. Steven G. Calabresi, The Terri Schiavo Case: In Defense of the Special Law Enact-
ed by Congress and President Bush, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 151, 151-52 (2006).
[Vol. 51:489
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Marie Schiavo." "Terri's Law," as the statute was called," permit-
ted "any parent" of Terri Schiavo to bring suit in federal district
court to redress the decision to withhold life support." Through
Terri's Law, Congress set aside the previous decade of state court
litigation over Schiavo's intentions, permitting relitigation of pre-
viously adjudicated issues. Although it was denominated a public
law, by its terms the law applied only to "[a]ny parent of Theresa
Marie Schiavo;" and in section 7 of the Act, entitled "No Prece-
dent for Future Legislation," the law provided that "[n]othing in
this Act shall constitute a precedent with respect to future legis-
lation, including the provision of private relief bills." 5 Limited to
one event, and providing relief for only two people, Terri's Law
provided a special exemption from standing preclusion rules that
apply to all other suits in district court.
A common type of special exemption statute is a private immi-
gration bill that grants special immigration status to named indi-
viduals or small, identifiable groups, like members of a family.
There have been thousands of private immigration bills enacted6
and these all tend to take a similar form. Each special immigra-
tion law names an individual 7 or small group" and provides that,
notwithstanding generally applicable legal requirements, the
named individuals are granted special immigration status, nor-
mally legal permanent residence.49
3. Special Legal or Financial Disabilities
Congress and state legislatures also enact laws targeting indi-
viduals for special legal or economic burdens. In one well-
publicized event, Congress enacted a statute that denied a par-
ticular father's court-ordered visitation rights based on unproved
allegations of abuse made by the child's mother." In the underly-
ing custody dispute, Elizabeth Morgan claimed that Eric
Foretich, her former husband, had sexually abused their minor
43. Id. at 152.
44. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15, 15-16 (2005).
45. Id.
46. LEE, supra note 1, at 2.
47. E.g., Priv. L. No. 107-1, 115 Stat. 2471 (2001).
48. E.g., Priv. L. No. 108-4, 118 Stat. 4028 (2004).
49. E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525
(2010).
50. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1207-08 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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child, Hilary. The trial court heard and rejected these claims of
abuse and found that visitation with her father was in Hilary's
best interests.5' In defiance of the court's order, Morgan sent Hil-
ary out of the country and, ultimately, fled the country to join her
daughter in hiding. In response, Congress enacted the Elizabeth
Morgan Act, which stripped the trial court of jurisdiction, permit-
ting Morgan and Hilary to return to the United States without
being subject to the trial court's findings and order.2
Similarly, in the guise of narrowly drawn public laws, states
levy taxes or regulatory burdens on individual natural persons or
51corporations.
II. SPECIAL LEGISLATION OFFENDS THE VALUE OF EQUALITY
In light of these examples, it should come as no surprise that
special legislation has long been abused by legislatures. First, it
is often used to target and punish suspected members of unpopu-
lar political minority groups without evidence or trial. During the
revolutionary period, Tories were the targets of special laws
stripping them of rights and even sentencing them to banishment
or death.4 During the twentieth century, suspected communists
were singled out for deportation or other mistreatment." Second,
the ability to enact special laws has led to widespread corruption.
During the nineteenth century, when special laws were the norm
in state legislatures, legislators brazenly sold special favors like
monopoly rights and tax breaks to wealthy constituents.56 Alt-
hough diminished, the overt sale of special legislation persists in-
to the modern era. In the famous Abscam case, legislators accept-
ed bribes in exchange for the promise to introduce special
immigration legislation, revealing that the ability to introduce
51. Id. at 1204-05.
52. Id. at 1203-04.
53. See e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 578 (1983); Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
n.13 (1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247-48, 248 n.20
(1978)).
54. See, e.g., Respublica v. Gordon, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 233 (Pa. 1788); LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 71-72 (1999); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN
RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787 97-98 (1956); An Act for Disposing of Certain Es-
tates, and Banishing Certain Persons, Therein Mentioned (1782), in 4 THE STATUTES AT
LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 516-17 (Thomas Cooper ed., 1838).
55. E.g., United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 440 (1965); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S.
135, 158 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
56. BINNEY, supra note 32, at 6-7.
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special legislation creates a market for legislators to trade on
their official duties for private gain.5 7 Third, when enacting spe-
cial legislation, the legislature engages in conduct that is not
properly legislative. Because special legislation creates a rule
that applies only to a known individual, it fails to set generally
applicable policy." Because it applies only to a particular factual
situation, special legislation resembles executive or judicial activ-
ity rather than legislative activity.59
Although each of these societal harms is important and worth
exploring at some length, this article focuses on just one: the chal-
lenge to equality caused by special legislation. There is, of course,
no universally accepted definition of equality and, as a result, no
universal agreement about what conception of equality should be
enforceable under the Constitution's Equal Protection Clause."
Nevertheless, some conceptions of legally enforceable equality are
well-articulated and widely held. Among them, the anti-
classification and anti-subordination theories of equal protection
stand out as attractive conceptions of equality because they have
theoretical, doctrinal, and historical support. As a result, these
conceptions continue to attract broad support among scholars and
courts. By examining special legislation in light of both the anti-
subordination and anti-classification principles, as well as a
number of other important conceptions of equality, it becomes
apparent that special legislation offends the principle of equality,
however it is conceived.1 Part I.A describes significant alterna-
tive visions of equality; Part II.B describes how special legislation
offends these visions of equality.
57. Bennett L. Gershman, Abscam, the Judiciary, and the Ethics of Entrapment, 91
YALE L.J. 1565, 1571-72 (1982) [hereinafter Gershman, Abscam].
58. Evan C. Zoldan, Congressional Dysfunction, Public Opinion, and the Battle Over
the Keystone XL Pipeline, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 617, 635 (2015) [hereinafter Zoldan, Con-
gressional Dysfunction].
59. E.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143-46 (1871); see also Act for
the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119 Stat. 15-16
(2005) (supplanting the judicial process); Keystone XL Pipeline Approval Act, S. 1, 114th
Cong. (2015) (side-stepping the xecutive process).
60. See Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 619-20.
61. My aim is not, as others have attempted, to reconcile or choose between the anti-
subordination and anti-classification theories.
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A. Alternative Visions of Equality
1. The Anti-Classification Conception of Equality
One highly influential and widely held approach to under-
standing equality is to consider the Equal Protection Clause an
anti-classification device. Sometimes called the anti-
differentiation theory,62 the anti-classification conception of equal-
ity stems from the Aristotelian ideal that like things should be
treated alike.63 Put otherwise, anti-classification's concern is
"whether people who are similarly situated have been treated
similarly."64
The anti-classification theory stresses formal equality5 and is
committed to the equal treatment of individuals rather than the
equal treatment of groups.66 Because of this emphasis, the anti-
classification principle is offended when a person is subjected to
differential treatment because of a morally irrelevant characteris-
tic, such as race, gender, religion, or national origin. 7 Treatment
according to a morally irrelevant characteristic strips a person of
her individual identity and reduces her to a set of assumptions or
stereotypes that frequently have no relation to her worth.6 Con-
sider, for example, a law that permits a married man to take his
wife as a dependent for tax purposes without showing that he
supports her financially; by contrast the statute requires a wom-
an to demonstrate that she actually supports her husband before
she may take him as a dependent. This law offends formal equali-
ty because it is rooted in the assumption, or stereotype, that
women are (and perhaps, should be) financially dependent on
62. Timothy Zick, Angry White Males: The Equal Protection Clause and "Classes of
One," 89 KY. L.J. 69, 98-99 (2001).
63. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassi-
fication or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 31 (2003).
64. Zick, supra note 62, at 98.
65. See Sonu Bedi, Collapsing Suspect Class with Suspect Classification: Why Strict
Scrutiny is Too Strict and Maybe Not Strict Enough, 47 GA. L. REV. 301, 310 (2013); Reva
B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional
Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 (2004).
66. Siegel, supra note 65, at 1473.
67. KATHERINE T. BARTLETT, DEBORAH L. RHODE & JOANNA L. GROSSMAN, GENDER &
LAW: THEORY, DOCTRINE, COMMENTARY 25 (6th ed. 2013); Bedi, supra note 65, at 310.
68. BARTLETT ET AL., supra note 67, at 25.
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their husbands, but that men are not financially dependent on
their wives."
Equality does not mean identity;0 as a result, despite its em-
phasis on formal equality, the anti-classification theory does not
suggest the identical treatment of all people.7 1 Recognizing that
legislative differentiation is inevitable72-and sometimes desira-
ble7 3-the anti-classification vision of equality endeavors to dis-
tinguish between permissible and impermissible classification.
For example, the anti-classification theory suggests that classifi-
cation is impermissible if it is not rational, that is, if the classifi-
cation does not serve its intended purpose.4 Moreover, it suggests
that classification is impermissible if the purpose of the classifica-
tion is itself illegitimate.
The anti-classification principle reflects both historical experi-
ence and constitutional doctrine. At the time of the framing of the
Constitution, bestowing unearned privileges, or levying unwar-
ranted disadvantages, on individuals or groups was considered an
improper use of state authority.76 Drawing on the classical idea
that, despite their manifest differences, people are the same from
a moral perspective,7 a founding-era notion of equality did not
permit the state to accord honor or privilege for reasons other
than merit.7 8 This view of equality did not prevent the state from
rewarding individuals with honors or compensation; rather, it
tried to distinguish between morally acceptable and unacceptable
distinctions.79 Earned privileges, like the privilege of representa-
69. Cf. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating statutory scheme
requiring women, but not men, to demonstrate that their spouses were actually financially
dependent before permitting them to declare them as dependents).
70. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 14; DEBORAH HELLMAN, WHEN Is DISCRIMINATION
WRONG? 2-3 (2011).
71. BARTLETT ETAL., supra note 67, at 25.
72. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL.
L. REV. 341, 343-44 (1949).
73. BARTLETT ETAL., supra note 67, at 25.
74. Bedi, supra note 65, at 310; Zick, supra note 62, at 100-01.
75. Zick, supra note 62, at 101-02.
76. Council of Censors, A Report of the Committee, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 35, 38 (Philadelphia, Francis Bailey 1784) [hereinaf-
ter PENNSYLVANIA REPORT]; Address of the Council of Censors (Feb. 14, 1786), in RECORDS
OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT 58 (Paul S. Gillies & D. Gregory
Sanford eds., 1991) [hereinafter VERMONT REPORT].
77. See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 6.
78. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI; VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, § 4
(1776).
79. See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 14.
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tives to Congress to be called "honourable,"8 or compensation
based on service to the community," were acceptable; by contrast
unearned, artificial privileges-like hereditary titles-were not
acceptable.2 This conception of equality reflects the revolutionary
generation's deep aversion to any social and political system that
resembled their conception of European feudalism, in which suc-
cess was dependent on birth and connections rather than on vir-
tue and talent,83 and which granted aristocratic classes special le-
gal and social privileges.84 Even the suggestion that a group had
aristocratic pretentions was sufficient to elicit popular opprobri-
um, as was made plain by the ferocious popular reaction to the
creation of the fraternal Society of the Cincinnati, whose mem-
bership was available only to descendants of Continental Army
officers.8" Just as collective, family-based rewards were anathema
to the revolutionary generation, so, too were collective, family
based punishments. The Constitution's Corruption of Blood and
Forfeiture Clause does not prevent a person from being punished
for his own crime, of course. But, it does prevent a person's de-
scendants from suffering economic disabilities because of their
ancestor's crime; it reflects the belief, as the Court has held, that
"the children should not bear the iniquity of the fathers.86
This anti-feudal, republican conception of equality articulated
during the revolutionary era is also reflected, somewhat modified,
in later Jacksonian democratic sentiments. Jackson's famous
message accompanying his veto of the national bank reflects the
anti-classification vision when it rejects the power of Congress to
grant "artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclu-
sive privileges."" Government grants of privilege, to be valid,
80. Thomas Paine, Reflection on Titles, 1 PA. MAG. 209, 209 (1775).
81. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI; HARRIS, supra note 17, at 22.
82. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 14; PENNSYLVANIA REPORT, supra note 76, at 38; Carl-
ton F. W. Larson, Titles of Nobility, Hereditary Privileges, and the Unconstitutionality of
Legacy Preferences in Public School Admissions, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1375, 1387-88
(2006); Paine, supra note 80, at 210.
83. See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
130 (1967); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 35,
78-79 (1969).
84. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *389-90; see also 3 THE DEBATES IN THE
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 291, 431
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES].
85. WOOD, supra note 83, at 399-400; Larson, supra note 82, at 1388-89, 1393.
86. U.S. Const. Art. III, § 3; Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 210 (1875).
87. Andrew Jackson, Veto Message (July 10, 1832), in 2 A COMPILATION OF THE
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1139, 1153 (James D. Richardson ed., 1910).
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must be confined-in Jackson's words-to providing "equal pro-
tection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors alike on
the high and the low, the rich and the poor."88 The anti-
classification conception of equality reflects the antebellum judi-
cial tradition disfavoring "class legislation," that is, legislation
that singles out a class for special treatment without a concomi-
tant public purpose."
Although the Supreme Court has retreated from its strongest
statements condemning class legislation, the Court's modern
equal protection cases emphasize the anti-classification concep-
tion of equality as well.9" In Adarand, the Court held that "gov-
ernmental action based on race" is "in most circumstances irrele-
vant and therefore prohibited."91 Rather than focusing on the
historical subordination of particular disfavored minority groups,
the Court focused on equal protection's role in protecting the right
of the individual to be free from wrongful discrimination." Typify-
ing the anti-classification conception of equality, Chief Justice
Roberts summed up the Court's current stance on equal protec-
tion in Parents Involved: "The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.'93
2. The Anti-Subordination Conception of Equality
The anti-classification conception of enforceable equality is of-
ten juxtaposed with the anti-subordination theory, which is itself
a widely held and well-supported theory.4 Together with the
closely related "anticaste"95 and "anti-domination'9 6 principles, the
anti-subordination conception of equality is concerned primarily
88. Id.
89. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885); see also Melissa L. Saunders, Equal
Protection, Class Legislation, and Colorblindness, 96 MICH. L. REV. 245, 261-62 (1997).
90. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013) ("[A]ny official ac-
tion that treats a person differently on account of his race or ethnic origin is inherently
suspect.") (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 523 (1980)).
91. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
92. Id.
93. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748
(2007).
94. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protec-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (1986); Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 622-23.
95. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2411 (conceiving of equal protection as an anticaste
principle that prohibits "translating highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into
systemic social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for society to do so").
96. See HELLMAN, supra note 70, at 171.
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with the disestablishment of tiers of favored and disfavored clas-
ses of people.97 As Owen Fiss described, the core of the principle
suggests that laws may not perpetuate or aggravate the "subor-
dinate position of a specially disadvantaged group."98 A law of-
fends the anti-subordination principle of equality when it creates
or reinforces a system that accords some members of society se-
cond-class status.9 The anti-subordination principle places spe-
cial emphasis on the role of preexisting social hierarchies in per-
petuating inequality. In contrast with the anti-classification
conception of equality, it posits that formally equal laws set
against the backdrop of persistent social hierarchy do not create
equality; rather, these laws merely reinforce already existing ine-
qualities."' Because of its focus on structural inequality, the anti-
subordination principle is offended when a group is subordinated
because it is the object of fear, hatred, or political scapegoating by
a dominant population.' In a related formulation, Professor Cass
Sunstein describes an anticaste principle that suggests that law
should not base "systematic social disadvantages" on "differences
that are both highly visible and irrelevant from the moral point of
,,102view.
Like the anti-classification theory of equality, the modern anti-
subordination principle, in all its permutations, has deep histori-
cal and doctrinal roots. A key preoccupation of the American gen-
eration that declared independence from Great Britain and
framed the Constitution was the elimination of social distinctions
that threatened to divide the new nation into classes of subordi-
nated and dominant citizens. Before independence, the American
colonists were incensed by moves in Parliament to establish an
American aristocracy."3 During the period of the framing of the
Constitution, those who drafted and ultimately ratified the docu-
ment debated how best to forestall the development of an aristo-
cratic elite."4 As Sunstein suggests, the anti-feudal sentiments
97. Hutchinson, supra note 16, at 622-23.
98. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107,
157 (1976).
99. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1515 (2d ed.
1988); Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2432, 2436.
100. Scott Grinsell, "The Prejudice of Caste": The Misreading of Justice Harlan and the
Ascendency of Anticlassification, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 317, 326 (2010).
101. Fiss, supra note 98, at 152.
102. Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2429.
103. BAILYN, supra note 83, at 278-79.
104. See, e.g., 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 277; 1 FARRAND, supra note 6, at
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expressed by the framing generation are directly connected to the
Constitution's clauses that prohibit both the states and federal
government from granting titles of nobility."5 Similarly, the fram-
ing generation rejected the subordination of individuals because
of their heterodox political beliefs or social status. They decried
the use of bills of attainder to punish political outcasts and other
social undesirables,1 6 foreswore opportunistic confiscations of
property,0 7 and renounced the authority to strip named citizens of
rights and privileges out of fear that this power would be used to
punish disfavored individuals. 8 Just as parts of Jackson's mes-
sage vetoing the national bank support the anti-classification vi-
sion of equality, the populist strains in his message exemplify the
anti-subordination approach to equality by rejecting the power of
the legislature "to make the rich richer and the potent more pow-
erful." 9
Also like the anti-classification principle, the anti-
subordination principle has been linked to the pre-Civil War judi-
cial tradition that disfavors class legislation."' Class legislation
was criticized in the years leading up to, and after, the Civil War
for creating classes of citizens that bear burdens, or receive bene-
fits, because of their membership in a group."' For example, the
grant of monopoly rights to particular companies was criticized
for according favored status to some at the expense of other, less
favored, members of the population."2 Similarly, the Black Codes,
which laid legal and social disadvantages on former slaves, were
criticized because they subordinated black people as a class to
white people as a class. Professor Akhil Reed Amar recognizes the
kinship between an anti-class legislation principle and earlier
constitutional history when he argues that the "Attainder Clause,
83, 402, 474, 544-46; 2 FARRAND, supra note 6, at 207, 530.
105. See Sunstein, supra note 16, at 2428-29. Sunstein suggests that the anticaste
principle he articulates grows out of the Constitution's explicit ban on titles of nobility. Id.
Perhaps the Title of Nobility Clause is, itself, a reflection of a deep anticaste, or at least
anti-feudal, sentiment that already was explicitly articulated at the time of the framing of
the Constitution.
106. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 84, at 66-67.
107. See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (Alexander Hamilton).
108. James Wilson, Considerations on the Bank of North America 1785, in
1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 60, 71-72 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall
eds., 2007).
109. Jackson, supra note 87, at 1153.
110. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 63, at 9-10.
111. Saunders, supra note 89, at 253-54.
112. Id. at 256, 273.
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in its logic and spirit, is an early forebear of the Equal Protection
Clause."'113
The anti-subordination principle is reflected in Brown v. Board
of Education. In Brown, the Court held that racial segregation in
public schools violates equal protection, in part, because of the
nation's history of discrimination against blacks. The Court rea-
soned that segregation of black children "solely because of their
race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way un-
likely ever to be undone.""' 4 Scholars explaining the anti-
subordination theory of equal protection emphasize this passage
of Brown, which focuses on the subordinated status of blacks cre-
ated by racial segregation."5 In Bakke, Justice Blackmun formu-
lated the paradigmatic statement of the anti-subordination con-
ception in the following way: "In order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in or-
der to treat some persons equally, we must treat them different-
ly."16 Although the anti-subordination principle is not the domi-
nant vision of enforceable equality articulated by the Court, the
principle received a strong endorsement in the Court's recent
Obergefell v. Hodges decision."7
The anti-classification and anti-subordination theories of equal
protection present partially overlapping,"' but distinct, visions of
equal protection. Both, for example, are offended by laws like the
Black Codes, but for different reasons. The anti-subordination
theory is offended by laws like the Black Codes because they bur-
dened a historically subordinated population; the anti-
classification theory is offended by these laws because they place
different legal burdens on groups based on race, which is a moral-
ly irrelevant characteristic. Although the two conceptions of
equality often overlap, they diverge over laws that use morally ir-
relevant characteristics as a basis for singling out historically
113. Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 203, 208 (1996).
114. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
115. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (1959).
116. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring).
117. Kenji Yoshino, A New Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV.
147, 174-79 (2015).
118. Bradley A. Areheart, The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination
Law, 63 ALA. L. REV. 955, 966-67 (2012); Balkin & Siegel, supra note 63, at 10.
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disadvantaged groups for advantages, like affirmative action
laws, rather than additional burdens.119
3. Other Significant Visions of Equal Protection
Although many conceptions of equality can be grouped loosely
together with either the anti-subordination or anti-classification
theories, there are a number of other notable theories of the role
of equal protection that warrant special mention. Foremost
among these is the political process school associated closely with
John Hart Ely. 2' To Ely, the power of courts to invalidate demo-
cratically enacted legislation is most strongly justified when the
legislation represents a malfunction in the political process."'
Specifically, courts are best positioned to check legislation by
which the "ins are choking off the channels of political change to
ensure that they will stay in and the outs will stay out" and when
representatives "are systematically disadvantaging some minori-
ty out of simple hostility or a prejudiced refusal to recognize
commonalities of interest, and thereby denying that minority the
protection afforded other groups by a representative system."'22
To Ely, then, the touchstone for judicial review under the Equal
Protection Clause is whether the political process itself is unde-
serving of trust and judicial intervention can reinforce the
strength of representation of the minority group. For example,
when a minority group is subject to hostility or prejudice by the
majority population, it may be unable to engage in the normal po-
litical process of coalition-building with other groups, leaving its
interests permanently unrepresented by the majority popula-
tion."' The political process concerns voiced by Ely are reflected
in equal protection doctrine, most notably in footnote 4 of Caro-
lene Products, in which Justice Stone suggested that searching
judicial review of statutes directed at "discrete and insular minor-
ities" may be appropriate because prejudice against these minori-
119. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 63, at 11.
120. Because of Ely's focus on politically subordinated minority groups, his work could
be grouped together with the anti-subordination theory. However, it rests on a distinct
enough principle to warrant separate consideration.
121. Jane S. Schacter, Ely at the Altar: Political Process Theory Through the Lens of the
Marriage Debate, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1363, 1371 (2011).
122. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 103
(1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY].
123. Id. at 153; Pamela S. Karlan, John Hart Ely and the Problem of Gerrymandering:
The Lion in Winter, 114 YALE L.J. 1329, 1336-38 (2005).
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ty groups "tends seriously to curtail the operation of those politi-
cal processes" that should protect them.2 4 Professor Victoria
Nourse has linked political process theories with the pre-Civil
War aversion to class legislation, which rejected the power of the
legislature to enact legislation with the purpose of either benefit-
ting powerful industries because of their close relationship to the
halls of power or harming politically powerless minorities
125groups.
Professor Deborah Hellman has advanced a theory that en-
deavors to distinguish between permissible and impermissible
classification on the basis of the classification's tendency to de-
mean.126 Because it is "a bedrock moral principle" that all people
are of equal moral worth, classifications that demean are wrong-
ful because they treat the individual as if she had diminished
moral worth.12' For Hellman, the touchstone for wrongful discrim-
ination is whether the classification fails to treat people as moral
equals."8 Hellman's theory finds support in a line of Supreme
Court cases that express sensitivity to the law's ability to stigma-
tize. In Lawrence v. Texas, the Court struck down a state law
criminalizing homosexual sexual activity, reasoning that a law
intruding into the private lives of consenting adults denies them
"respect" and "demean[s] their existence.' '"s In its recent Oberge-
fell decision, the Court reiterated this principle, holding that
state laws limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples "demeans
gays and lesbians" by excluding them from the "central institu-
tion" of marriage."'
B. Special Legislation Offends Different Conceptions of Equality
Although there is no universal agreement about how the value
of equality should be enforced, the anti-classification and anti-
subordination conceptions, along with the other significant theo-
ries noted above, represent plausible and widely held visions of
124. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, 152 n.4 (1938).
125. V.F. Nourse & Sarah A. Maguire, The Lost History of Governance and Equal Pro-
tection, 58 DUKE L.J. 955, 995 (2009) ("[P]olitical-process theories ... are prefigured in the
doctrine of class legislation.").
126. HELLMAN, supra note 70, at 171.
127. Id. at 6, 172.
128. Id. at 31.
129. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 578 (2003).
130. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601-02 (2015).
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equality. This section compares the three categories of special
laws described in Part I-special transfers of wealth, special ex-
emption laws, and special laws imposing legal and financial pen-
alties-with the different conceptions of equality described in
Part II.A. This analysis reveals that special legislation offends
one or more widely held visions of equality.
1. Special Legislation Offends the Anti-Classification Conception
of Equality
Special legislation offends the anti-classification conception of
equality because it often accords legal and financial privileges
and penalties without regard to morally relevant characteristics
or an individual's contribution to society, and without any ration-
al connection between the stated goal of the legislation and the
effect of the legislation. Consider the financial transfer to
Lautenberg. The statute transferring wealth to Lautenberg made
the receipt of public benefits wholly contingent on a morally irrel-
evant characteristic. Whatever her virtues as a person, the spe-
cial benefit was conferred by Congress on Lautenberg without re-
gard to her character; the one and only factor that Congress
considered was the fact that she had been married to a former
Senator. The failure of the law to take into account Lautenberg's
moral worth as an individual, and treatment of her as a member
of a class whose sole distinction is a moral irrelevancy, offends
the anti-classification conception of equality. Indeed, gratuitous
transfers of wealth to a person, based solely on family connec-
tions, are menacingly close to the feudal tradition that the anti-
classification conception of equality squarely rejects."'
Moreover, the transfer accords a privilege to Lautenberg, in
this case money, without regard to any service to the community
that she herself performed. A gratuitous payment that does not
flow from any legal obligation epitomizes the kind of "artificial
distinctions.., gratuities, and exclusive privileges"'32 that the an-
ti-classification theory rejects. Indeed, a transfer of wealth to an
individual because of another person's service to the community
offends the anti-classification theory's insistence-as epitomized
by Massachusetts's 1780 Constitution-that no one has a right
"to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, dis-
131. See supra Part II.A.1.
132. Jackson, supra note 87, at 1153.
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tinct from those of the community, [other] than what arises from
the consideration of services rendered to the public."'33 Because
Mrs. Lautenberg received a special financial benefit precisely be-
cause of the service of another-indeed, a family member-the
special benefit she received offends the anti-classification theory
of equality as surely as the special, family-based prerogatives of
the Society of the Cincinnati offended the anti-feudal sensibilities
of the framing generation.
Consider also the example of Terri's Law, which made a special
exception from standing preclusion rules for "any parent" of Terri
Schiavo, and no one else."4 Terri's Law offends the anti-
classification conception of equality by making a distinction be-
tween Schiavo's parents and others without regard to any morally
relevant characteristic. Every year, generally applicable preclu-
sion rules prevent countless individuals from relitigating, in dis-
trict court, cases previously settled by state court judgments.3 '
Moreover, even though Schiavo's circumstances were, admittedly,
somewhat unusual, they were not unique: both proponents and
opponents of Terri's Law acknowledged that there were "thou-
sands" of people "who face similar situations."3 ' By singling out
"any parent" of Terri Schiavo for special treatment, and specifi-
cally providing that Terri's Law would not "constitute a precedent
with respect to future legislation,"'' 7 Terri's Law treated Schiavo
and her parents differently than those thousands of similarly sit-
uated individuals. For these same reasons, Terri's Law offends
the anti-classification principle by failing to meet even a mini-
mum rationality standard. Taking Congress at its word that the
legislation's purpose was to save a life,"8 the fact that there were
"thousands" of people in the same situation as Schiavo makes the
decision to do so through a special, non-precedential statute irra-
tional."5
133. See MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. I, art. VI; HARRIS, supra note 17, at 22.
134. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15, 15-16 (2005).
135. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012), construed in Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980).
136. 151 CONG. REC. 82928, 2929 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) (statements of Sen. Tom
Harkin & Sen. Ron Wyden).
137. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15-16 (2005).
138. 151 CONG. REC. S2926, 2929 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) (statement of Sen. George
Allen)
139. Terri's Law, like many special laws, may be the product of a cognitive bias called
the "identified victim" effect. See Tehila Kogut & Ilana Ritov, The "Identified Victim" Ef-
fect: An Identified Group, or Just a Single Individual?, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING
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Similarly, special immigration laws offend the anti-
classification conception of equality by singling out an individual
based on morally irrelevant characteristics. A special immigra-
tion law singles out one visa applicant from a pool and grants its
beneficiary special treatment not accorded to other applicants.
Moreover, special immigration laws grant the beneficiary special
treatment at the expense of other applicants: each special immi-
gration law provides that, when the beneficiary receives special
immigration status, "the total number of immigrant visas that
are made available to natives of the country of birth" of the bene-
ficiary of the special law, must be "reduce[d] by 1." 14 By benefit-
ting one person at the expense of another, indeed another person
from the same country as the beneficiary, special immigration
laws draw legal distinctions between individuals without any ac-
companying morally relevant distinction. Much like Terri's Law,
special immigration laws are not based on any congressional find-
ings that the beneficiary is more worthy than any of the benefi-
ciary's countrymen, or any other similarly situated individual
who is denied this benefit. Indeed, special immigration laws are,
perhaps, more obviously based on morally irrelevant characteris-
tics because they are enacted without even the limited debate
that accompanied the enactment of Terri's Law.
For many of these same reasons, special exemption laws like
the Elizabeth Morgan Act offend the anti-classification vision of
equality. The Act singled out Foretich for legal disabilities based
on unproved allegations of sexual abuse. Although he had been
exonerated in court, and was granted joint custody of his daugh-
ter, his former wife continued to press allegations of abuse after
the court's order. In response, Congress eliminated the court's
ability to enforce its custody order by stripping it of jurisdiction
over the suit. In addition, the Act supplanted the court's order by
denying Foretich custody, treating him as if he had been guilty,
rather than exonerated, of sexual abuse."' Certainly, the anti-
classification principle would not be offended if Foretich's visita-
tion rights were terminated by a court after a finding that he had
committed the alleged abuse. However, by terminating his legal
rights without any supporting factual determination, Congress
based its decision to treat Foretich like a criminal on the fact that
157, 159 (2005).
140. E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525
(2010).
141. Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198, 1224 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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he was merely accused of a heinous crime. In light of the common
law and constitutional presumption that criminally accused are
innocent until proven guilty,142 the legal distinction that Congress
drew when it penalized Foretich, levying a legal penalty on him
because he was accused of a crime, was based on a morally irrele-
vant distinction.
2. Special Legislation Offends the Anti-Subordination
Conception of Equality
Special legislation offends the anti-subordination conception of
equality because it often plays on societal prejudices and fears,
reinforces existing social hierarchies, and inures to the benefit of
the well-connected and to the detriment of the disadvantaged.
Consider again the Elizabeth Morgan Act. The Act offends the
anti-subordination conception of equality by penalizing Foretich
because he is member of a group that is treated by society with
fear and contempt: the criminally accused and, more specifically,
those accused of sex offenses.
The anti-subordination conception of equality would view Con-
gress's elimination of Foretich's rights to a jury and to confront
witnesses against him through the prism of preexisting social
structures. Notably, the Elizabeth Morgan Act was enacted
against the backdrop of the odium with which our society ap-
proaches those accused of violent, and especially sex-related,
crimes. Indeed, draconian state and federal laws broadly defin-
ing.4 and harshly punishing... sex offenses are a well-known part
of our social fabric. In light of this existing societal environment,
the Elizabeth Morgan Act can be seen as subordinating Foretich
142. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) ("[A] presumption of innocence in
favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary.").
143. E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-12-131 (2016), noted in Major Andrew D. Flor, Sex Offender
Registration Laws and the Uniform Code of Military Justice: A Primer, ARMY LAW. 1, 10
n.106 (2009) (noting how § 13A-12-131 might require one to register as a sex offender
when displaying obscene bumper stickers); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-103-104, 12-12-
903(13)(r) (2016) (requiring registration as a sex offender for false imprisonment of a mi-
nor). For other state laws that define sex crimes to include non-sexual behavior, like
streaking or public urination, see generally NIC/WCL PROJECT ON ADDRESSING PRISON
RAPE, FIFTY STATE SURVEY OF ADULT SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION REQUIREMENTS
(2009), http://www.csom.org/pubs/50*/20state /20survey /20adult /20registries.pdf.
144. See, e.g., Paul Woolverton, NC Law: Teens Who Take Nude Selfie Photos Face
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because he is a member of a feared and hated subclass of society.
Moreover, the Act can be seen as political scapegoating; Congress
used the Act to demonstrate, in powerful and final terms, its
(quite understandable) distaste for sex offenders by curtailing the
rights of an individual accused, but not convicted, of this type of
offense.
Perhaps less intuitively, the anti-subordination conception of
equality also can be offended by special legislation that grants
benefits. Consider the special transfer of wealth to Lautenberg.45
This transfer offends the anti-subordination theory's commitment
to disestablishing tiers of favored and disfavored citizens. The
transfer of wealth to Lautenberg provided a financial benefit to a
family member of a United States Senator for no reason other
than her relationship to the late Senator. In other words, she re-
ceived a financial benefit because of her social proximity to the
nation's established elite. The anti-subordination conception of
liberty is offended by this transfer because it reinforces the al-
ready-existing gap in wealth and power between members of the
ruling elite and the rest of the population.
The fact that this benefit is, in practice though not by law,
available to all survivors of deceased Congressmen does little to
mitigate the concern: indeed, it highlights the fact that the trans-
fer to Lautenberg represents a pervasive practice-perpetrated
by the nation's lawmakers-of benefitting family members of the
nation's elite merely because of their status. To put it in colloqui-
al terms, the financial benefit enjoyed by Lautenberg is a mani-
festation of an "I'll scratch your back if you scratch mine" mental-
ity by which members of Congress have agreed to share public
benefits paid for by the public but not available to the public.
Because the anti-subordination conception of equality is sensi-
tive to the way that neutral laws operate in the context of preex-
isting social hierarchies, the anti-subordination conception of
equality would be offended by the fact that the beneficiaries of
this benefit-sharing practice are financial as well as political
elites. Indeed, more than half of United States Congressmen,
both Representatives and Senators (including former Senator
Lautenberg), are millionaires.146 As a result, the decision to trans-
145. Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127 Stat. 558,
565 (2013).
146. Alan Rappeport, Making it Rain: Members of Congress Are Mostly Millionaires,
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fer wealth to Lautenberg by this special law would be recognized
by the anti-subordination theory as having the effect of shoring
up wealth in the already richest members of society. In President
Jackson's words, it is a distribution of benefits "to make the rich
richer and the potent more powerful."'147
3. Special Legislation Offends Other Significant Conceptions of
Equality
In addition to the anti-subordination and anti-classification
conceptions of equality, special legislation offends a number of
other significant visions of equality. Special legislation offends
the political process theory's conception of enforceable equality
because it often reflects the inability of minority groups to protect
themselves through the normal political process through coali-
tion-building with members of other groups. Consider the Eliza-
beth Morgan Act: through this statute, Foretich was stripped of
his court-ordered rights because he belonged to a pariah group,
the class of those accused of violent, and in particular,- sex, of-
fenses. Those accused of sex crimes are a much-loathed group;
they are unable to protect themselves through the normal politi-
cal processes because other political groups are generally unwill-
ing publicly to side with them. Indeed, as current trends in sexual
assault investigation procedures demonstrate, those accused of
sex crimes are apt to be treated with suspicion and odium, and
denied basic protections like due process of law, the presumption
of innocence, and the right to mount an adequate defense.148 As a
result, a law like the Elizabeth Morgan Act is not just an arbi-
trary limitation of one individual's rights; rather, it represents an
attack on a member of an outcast class that is prevented by socie-
tal distaste from protecting itself through its association with
other societal groups.
Special laws also warrant searching judicial review under the
political process vision of equality because these laws can lead to
a political process that is demonstrably undeserving of trust.
When special legislation was the norm in state legislatures, cor-
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015, 5:54 PM), http://www.nytimes.com/politics/first-draft/2015/
01/12/making-it-rain-members-of-congress-are-mostly-millionaires.
147. Jackson, supra note 87, at 1153.
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ruption in the form of bribery was considered to be inseparable
from special legislation. Lobbyists engaged in the "mercenary
traffic in legislation" would obtain, through bribery, legislation
conferring "some special or valuable privilege, franchise or pecu-
niary advantage" on their clients."9 Even when special legislation
is not expressly the result of bribery (which is, admittedly, proba-
bly rare), legislators stand to benefit from introducing bills to
benefit powerful or wealthy constituents. The desire to win "ac-
claim or political advantage" encourages legislators to introduce
legislation for the benefit of particular constituents.5 ' Legislators,
assured of the passage of their special bills because of the culture
of logrolling, have been known to "eagerly introduce[] special
bills" because it will lead to their own political aggrandizement.'
Just as the carrot of political advancement and contributions
leads legislators to cater to individual wealthy constituents, the
threat of defeat at the polls acts as a stick driving similar behav-
ior.1
2
Although most are surely not the product of outright corrup-
tion, special immigration laws provide a palpable example of how
the power to enact special laws can infect the legislative process
with untrustworthiness. In the notorious "Abscam" scandal, FBI
agents posed as the representatives of wealthy Arab sheiks who
purportedly wanted to immigrate to the United States."3 The
agents offered federal officials bribes in exchange for their prom-
ise to introduce private immigration bills". for the benefit of the
fictitious sheiks.5' Many of these officials readily accepted the
bribes, promising to introduce special legislation in return. In all,
"twenty-five individuals, including one United States Senator, six
United States Representatives, and other public officials" were
indicted for corruption related to the Abscam investigation."' Be-
cause they are closely associated with bribery and other forms of
corruption, special laws reflect a legislative process that can be
undeserving of trust.
149. Ireland, supra note 18, at 277.
150. Id. at 274.
151. Id. at 271, 273-75.
152. Id. at 275.
153. Gershman, Abscam, supra note 57, at 1571-72.
154. United States v. Myers, 527 F. Supp. 1206, 1225 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), affd, 692 F.2d
823 (2d Cir. 1982).
155. Gershman, Abscam, supra note 57, at 1572.
156. Id. at 1575; see also LEE, supra note 1, at 9.
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Finally, special laws offend Hellman's concern with the de-
meaning effect of classification because special laws often demean
their target. Consider again the Elizabeth Morgan Act. Congress
enacted the statute on the heels of a custody dispute in which
Foretich was accused of sexual abuse by his former wife. Alt-
hough the court found that these charges were baseless, Congress
reversed the court's custody order. By effectively denying him
custody, Congress implied that Foretich was in fact guilty of the
despicable conduct of which he was accused. The effect of the
Elizabeth Morgan Act, in other words, was to demean Foretich by
declaring that he was guilty of committing sexual abuse despite
his exoneration in court.
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CANNOT ADEQUATELY CURTAIL
SPECIAL LEGISLATION
Special legislation compromises the value of equality however
it is articulated. Because the Equal Protection Clause has come to
embody equality, it is natural to look to this clause as the consti-
tutional tool best suited to curtail special legislation. Indeed, the
Court has struggled to reconcile special legislation with its equal
protection doctrine."7 Ultimately, however, it has been unable to
articulate a vision of equal protection that consistently and ade-
quately addresses special legislation. Scholars have expanded on
the Court's attempts by suggesting a broader reading of equal
protection doctrine to restrain some types of special legislation."'
But despite these efforts, and despite the strong association be-
tween equality and the Equal Protection Clause, this multipur-
pose constitutional provision cannot curtail special legislation on
its own. This part describes the doctrinal and conceptual limita-
tions that prevent the Equal Protection Clause from adequately
protecting the value of equality by curtailing special legislation.
Part IV introduces an alternative-the value of legislative gener-
ality-as a more promising mechanism to restrain special laws in
a coherent and meaningful manner. It also demonstrates how the
Equal Protection Clause, although on its own incapable of curtail-
ing special legislation, contributes to the parameters of a value of
legislative generality.
157. Robert C. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, and Village of Willowbrook
v. Olech, 78 WASH. L. REV. 367, 368-69 (2003) [hereinafter Farrell, Classes, Persons,
Equal Protection].
158. See William D. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One/Failing Equal Protection, 55
WM. & MARY L. REV. 435, 440 (2013) [hereinafter Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One].
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A. Equal Protection Doctrine Does Not Curtail Special
Legislation
As it is currently formulated, equal protection doctrine does not
consistently or adequately restrain the power of the legislature to
enact special laws despite the inequality they create. Barring
fundamental changes in equal protection doctrine, the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is ill-suited to address the inequalities created by
special legislation.
1. Equal Protection Doctrine Is Primarily Committed to
Preventing Burdens Imposed Because of a Suspect Trait
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the Equal Protection
Clause is primarily concerned with governmental classifications
that sort individuals into groups based on some identifiable char-
acteristic."' However, because legislation inevitably divides the
world into classes that are treated differently in some respect,
160
equal protection does not prohibit all classification.' Rather, the
type of classification determines the level of scrutiny to which the
Court subjects it. If the government classifies based on a trait
that is considered suspect (paradigmatically race'62), the Court
will apply strict scrutiny to the classification, virtually guarantee-
ing its invalidation. 3 By contrast, legislation that implicates no
suspect trait (traditionally economic or social legislation) is re-
viewed under the deferential rational basis test.6 6 Between these
two poles exists legislation that classifies based on a quasi-
suspect trait, like gender, which receives intermediate scrutiny.6 '
Despite serious criticisms of the Court's multi-tiered approach to
the Equal Protection Clause,"' with some notable exceptions,7
159. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008); Pers. Adm'r of Mass.
v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 271-72 (1979); Zick, supra note 62, at 110.
160. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, supra note 157, at 368-69; Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 72, at 343-45.
161. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 271.
162. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954). Other suspect classifica-
tions include alienage and national origin. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 440-41 (1985).
163. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 510 (2004).
164. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488, 491 (1955);
Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1947).
165. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198-99 (1976).
166. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 163, at 484; Marcy Strauss, Reevaluating Suspect
Classifications, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 135, 138 (2011).
167. See City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446; Robert C. Farrell, The Two Versions of Ra-
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this well-worn formula persists. Outside the realm of classifica-
tion, the Court also subjects legislation to strict scrutiny when it
burdens fundamental rights, like the right to vote.168 Because spe-
cial legislation does not classify according to a suspect trait and
rarely, if ever, burdens a right that might be considered funda-
mental, there is little room for meaningful review of special legis-
lation under equal protection doctrine.
First, special laws do not confer special treatment based on a
suspect trait. Take, for example, the special transfer of wealth to
Lautenberg. The class created by the special law includes
Lautenberg alone. Because the class is defined without reference,
even implicitly, 169 to a trait that has been designated suspect by
the Court, like race, religion, or national origin,7 ' the special
transfer does not single her out because of a suspect trait. The
same can be said of Terri's Law, which singled out Schiavo's par-
ents, but not because of a suspect trait. Perhaps less intuitively,
even a special immigration law, which grants special immigration
status to a foreign national, does not make distinctions based on
the country of origin of the beneficiary of that law. By requiring
the diminution of available visas to compatriots of the special
law's beneficiary,171 each special immigration law makes a distinc-
tion between two foreign nationals who come from the same coun-
try, not between a foreign national and a citizen of the United
States. Therefore, although the beneficiary of a special immigra-
tion law is receiving a benefit related to a suspect trait (nationali-
ty), the law providing for special treatment does not distinguish
between the beneficiary and others because of that trait.
This last illustration reveals an important point about special
legislation. Because it singles out an individual qua individual ra-
ther than as a member of a class, special legislation does not tar-
get an individual because of a trait that is the subject of height-
ened scrutiny."' As a result, special legislation will never be
tional-Basis Review and Same-Sex Relationships, 86 WASH. L. REV. 281, 305 (2011) [here-
inafter Farrell, Two Versions of Rational-Basis]; Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, su-
pra note 17, at 759.
168. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964).
169. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886).
170. See Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam);
Strauss, supra note 166, at 146.
171. E.g., Priv. L. No. 111-1, 124 Stat. 4523 (2010); Priv. L. No. 111-2, 124 Stat. 4525
(2010).
172. See William D. Araiza, Irrationality and Animus in Class-of-One Equal Protection
Cases, 34 ECOLOGY L. Q. 493, 503 (2007).
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reviewed under heightened scrutiny for classifying according to a
suspect trait. Accordingly, unless the classification burdens a
fundamental right, a court will review special legislation under
the highly deferential rational basis standard.173
Second, most special laws are economic or social in nature, in-
cluding wealth transfers,74 regulatory measures,175 and statutes
relating to tax treatment.176 As economic or social legislation, the-
se special laws receive a great deal of judicial deference.77 The
high level of deference accorded economic measures is virtually
complete in the context of public benefits. For example, in Kotch,
the Court upheld a statute conveying state-sponsored preferential
treatment to particular families under the Equal Protection
Clause as economic legislation."' In Kotch, the challenged law
limited the approval of pilot's license applications to only those
people who had served as apprentices to current riverboat pi-
lots."'9 The current pilots ensured that the apprentices, and thus
future pilots, were chosen from the relatives and friends of the
current pilots, effectively perpetuating a state-sponsored monopo-
ly based largely on bloodline.'0 The Court acknowledged that the
result of the law was pervasive, state-sponsored nepotism; never-
theless, the Court upheld the law under the Equal Protection
Clause after speculating that family tradition might justify the
nepotism.' As a consequence of this permissive approach toward
economic and social legislation and, in particular, public benefits,
the vast majority of special laws are outside of the reach of equal
protection doctrine.
Third, even when the Court has struck down legislation under
the rational basis standard, it has not done so for special legisla-
tion. Although the tiered scrutiny model describes the vast major-
173. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977).
174. See, e.g., Continuing Appropriations Act of 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-46, § 145, 127
Stat. 558, 565 (2013).
175. See, e.g., Energy Reserves Grp., Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 412
n.13 (1983) (citing Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 247-48, 248 n.20
(1978)).
176. See Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40 (1933) (rejecting equal protec-
tion challenge to special state tax exemption for a particular company); DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 80 (1991).
177. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955).
178. See, e.g., Kotch v. Bd. of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 564 (1947).
179. Id. at 555.
180. See id.
181. See id. at 563-64.
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ity of the Court's equal protection cases, there are a few cases in
which the Court has purported to apply the rational basis stand-
ard but in fact failed to accord the legislature the deference nor-
mally associated with it.' These cases apply a standard that is
often referred to as "rational basis with bite."'183 The Court has de-
clined to explain the circumstances in which it will subject legis-
lation to the rational basis with bite standard, and scholars have
struggled to divine a coherent principle from the set of cases in
which it has been applied.1 4 Scholars such as Professors
Yoshino"8' and Pollvogt86 have identified animus as a motivating
principle. They argue that the Court applies rational basis with
bite when it identifies the presence of animus on the part of the
legislature. Even if legislative animus does trigger rational basis
with bite, it will not likely apply to special legislation in most cas-
es. As noted, most special laws concern special benefits, like the
transfer to Mrs. Lautenberg, or exemptions from the generally
applicable laws, like Terri's Law. These types of statutes simply
do not implicate any concern with animus. Moreover, animus is a
difficult concept to define and apply. Although some special laws,
like the Elizabeth Morgan Act,'87 could be attributed to animus
against suspected sex offenders, most special burdens, like special
taxes or other economic burdens, would not rise to the level of an-
imus as suggested by the Court's few rational basis with bite cas-
es.
In light of the Equal Protection Clause's commitments to mem-
bers of suspect classes and fundamental rights, there is not much
room, doctrinally, for its application to special legislation.
2. Equal Protection Doctrine's Limited Relevance to Special
Legislation
Although the primary commitments of the Equal Protection
Clause involve the protection of members of suspect classes and
182. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537-38
(1973).
183. E.g., Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 759-60.
184. See Farrell, Two Versions of Rational-Basis, supra note 167, at 305-06.
185. Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, supra note 17, at 763.
186. Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 924
(2012).
187. Pub. L. No. 104-205, § 350, 110 Stat. 2951, 2979 (1996) (codified at D.C. CODE §
11-925 (2001)).
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fundamental rights, there are strains of equal protection doctrine
that address phenomena similar to special legislation. The first
strain disfavors legislation that singles out a class for special
treatment, called "class legislation," and the second disfavors ad-
ministrative action that singles out an individual for special ad-
ministrative treatment, called the "class-of-one" theory of equal
protection. Although neither class legislation nor the class-of-one
theory addresses special legislation directly, each is similar
enough to warrant particular consideration. However, despite
their potential to restrain special legislation, neither theory plays
a viable role in modern equal protection doctrine.
a. The False Start of Class Legislation
Immediately following the adoption of the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court expressed a willingness to read it to invalidate
"class legislation," a close relative of special legislation that sin-
gles out a class (as opposed to merely identifiable individuals) for
special benefits or burdens.8 ' In Barbier v. Connolly, the Court
proclaimed that "[c]lass legislation, discriminating against some
and favoring others, is prohibited."'89 Despite this broad promise
to enforce equality, including, perhaps, to curtail special legisla-
tion, Barbier itself contained the seeds of the eventual doctrinal
irrelevance of class legislation. Barbier concerned a state law that
required public laundries to cease washing and ironing clothes at
night. The owner of a laundry challenged this restriction, claim-
ing that it discriminated between the class of businesses that in-
cluded just laundries and the class of businesses that included all
other enterprises.9 The Court rejected the laundry owner's claim,
holding that the regulation fell within the "police power" of the
state to promote its citizens' "health, peace, morals, education,
and good order."'' Because the laundry business entailed a risk of
fire, the state's restriction on hours of operation fell within its po-
lice power.'92
Importantly, the Court distinguished laws that fell within the
state's police power from legislation "discriminating against some
188. Nourse & Maguire, supra note 125, at 966-70.
189. 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
190. Id. at 30.
191. Id. at 31.
192. Id. at 30-32.
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and favoring others."'1 93 The Court acknowledged that the "very
necessities of society" sometimes require the state to enact stat-
utes that create burdens for some classes of people in order to
promote a "public purpose.'94 Even if a statute creates different
rules for different classes, however, it is not impermissible class
legislation as long as it operates "alike upon all persons and prop-
erty under the same circumstances and conditions."'' Put other-
wise, discrimination is permissible so long as it "affects alike all
persons similarly situated.""' 6
Determining whether two classes were "similarly situated,"
and whether the state was promoting a "public purpose," proved
an impossible task for the Court to administer in a principled and
meaningful manner. In the decades after Barbier, the Court reaf-
firmed the general principle that class legislation violated the
Equal Protection Clause but consistently found reasons not to ap-
ply this principle."7 In Holden v. Hardy, the Court broadly inter-
preted the scope of the state's police power to protect public
health, upholding a state law regulating working hours in a sin-
gle industry."' The Court also interpreted Barbier's "similarly
situated" language narrowly. For example, in Missouri Pacific
Railway Co. v. Mackey, a statute created a liability scheme that
applied only to the railroad industry. The Court upheld the regu-
lation against the charge that it was impermissible class legisla-
tion because the legislation treated all railroads, although not all
industries, the same.19
Ultimately, the Equal Protection Clause's potential to limit
class legislation was never realized. Because of the difficulty ad-
ministering the class legislation principle, the Court settled on
the familiar tiers of scrutiny described above to enforce equal pro-
tection."' Despite the impressive work of scholars demonstrating
that the Equal Protection Clause originally was understood to
193. Id. at 32.
194. Id. at 31-32.
195. Id. at 32.
196. Id.
197. See Nourse & Maguire, supra note 125, at 971-72, 980; Tussman & tenBroek, su-
pra note 72, at 343.
198. 169 U.S. 366, 380, 398 (1898).
199. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Mackey, 127 U.S. 205, 210 (1888).
200. See Saunders, supra note 89, at 247-48; Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 72, at
342.
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address class legislation,°' therefore, modern doctrine does not
represent a significant barrier to class legislation.
b. The Broken Promise of the Class-of-One Theory of Equal
Protection
The Court's most explicit attempt to situate particularized gov-
ernment action within the framework of equal protection doctrine
is the "class-of-one" doctrine that it articulated in Village of Wil-
lowbrook v. Olech.°2 In Olech, homeowners in the Village of Wil-
lowbrook asked the Village to connect their home to the munici-
pal water supply.2 3 They claimed that, in exchange for the
connection, the Village demanded an abnormally large easement
(thirty-three feet) compared to the demand made on other Village
homeowners (fifteen feet).2"4 Although the Olechs could claim no
membership in a protected class, the Court held that the Olechs
stated a claim under traditional equal protection analysis."5 Rec-
ognizing a theory that had been developed in the lower courts, the
Supreme Court held that a person may not be singled out as a
"class of one" by government action if the differential treatment
was "irrational and wholly arbitrary.2 6 After Olech, lower courts
and scholars struggled with how to square Olech's seemingly
broad class-of-one theory with traditional equal protection doc-
trine."7 By holding that only arbitrary treatment and particular-
ized action were required to state a claim under the class-of-one
theory, Olech had the potential to expand the role that equal pro-
tection doctrine plays in the restraint of particularized govern-
ment action, including special legislation. Some scholars read
201. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, Original Meaning and Constitutional Redemption, 24
CONST. COMMENT. 427, 450 (2007); David E. Bernstein, Revisiting Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2008); William N. Eskridge Jr., Original Meaning and
Marriage Equality, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1067, 1084-85 (2015); Saunders, supra note 89, at
247-48.
202. See 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000); William D. Araiza, Constitutional Rules and Institu-
tional Roles: The Fate of the Equal Protection Class of One and What It Means for Congres-
sional Power to Enforce Constitutional Rights, 62 SMU L. REV. 27, 44-46 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter Araiza, Constitutional Rules]; Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One, supra note 158, at
440.
203. Olech, 528 U.S. at 563.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 565.
206. Id. at 564-65.
207. See Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One, supra note 158, at 439; Farrell, Classes,
Persons, Equal Protection, supra note 157, at 403; Robert C. Farrell, The Equal Protection
Class of One Claim: Olech, Engquist, and the Supreme Court's Misadventure, 61 S.C. L.
REV. 107, 124 (2009) [hereinafter Farrell, Class of One Claim].
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Olech in this way, arguing that the basic promise of the Equal
Protection Clause, equality, is offended by singling out an indi-
vidual as a class of one."8 The Court's broad rendering of equal
protection doctrine in Olech seemed to follow widely held notions
of equality suggesting that it is unfair to target a person for indi-
vidualized treatment.9
The inchoate promise of Olech, however, was cut short by
Engquist v. Oregon Department of Agriculture, the Court's se-
cond-and final to date-articulation of the class-of-one doc-
trine.21 In Engquist, an employee claimed that a state agency's
decision to fire her had been irrational and that, as a result, she
had been singled out as a class of one.21' The Court rejected this
use of the class-of-one theory, holding that it applied only when
there is a "clear standard against which departures" by the gov-
ernment "could be readily assessed.,212 In Olech, the clear stand-
ard was the fifteen-foot easement normally required by the Vil-
lage of Willowbrook; the Village's demand for thirty-three feet
was a departure from that standard."' By contrast, forms of gov-
ernment action that "by their nature involve discretionary deci-
sionmaking based on a vast array of subjective, individualized as-
sessments," like government employment decisions, are not
cognizable under the class-of-one theory."4
The immediate effect of Engquist was dramatic: Sensing that
Engquist might be the death-knell for the class-of-one doctrine,
Professor Farrell, among other scholars, concluded that "there
does not seem to be anything left" of the doctrine."' The lower
courts have largely borne out this prediction. Immediately after
the Engquist decision, lower courts read the holding broadly,
dismissing a host of class-of-one claims where the discriminatory
government action was discretionary, including "selective parole
decisions, government contracting, and municipal code and crim-
inal law enforcement and prosecution" decisions."6 In narrow cir-
cumstances, outside of the context of government employment,
208. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One, supra note 158, at 441-42.
209. See Araiza, Constitutional Rules, supra note 202, at 41.
210. 553 U.S. 591 (2008).
211. Id. at 595.
212. Id. at 602.
213. Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 565 (2000).
214. Engquist, 553 U.S. at 603.
215. Farrell, Class of One Claim, supra note 207, at 129.
216. Araiza, Flunking the Class-of-One, supra note 158, at 450-51.
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however, other lower courts have continued to find the class-of-
one theory viable.1
Whether the Supreme Court will further limit, or eliminate al-
together, the class-of-one theory remains to be seen. What is cer-
tain, however, is that the scope of the theory is narrow. Whatever
its merits in the context of executive agency action, the theory is
an uncomfortable fit with legislative classifications."' In particu-
lar, the class-of-one doctrine, as limited by Engquist, is unlikely
to serve as a basis for challenging special legislation for two rea-
sons. First, special legislation is rarely if ever a deviation from a
clear standard as understood in Engquist. Second, Engquist's
parsimonious rendering of the class-of-one doctrine brings it into
line with doctrinal areas that address classes of one outside of the
equal protection context.
First, Engquist recast Olech as a case about the government's
deviation from a clear standard.19 But, a close look at Engquist
reveals that, by "clear standard," the Court means only a classifi-
cation that is rationally related to its purpose. The Court de-
scribed the defect in Olech's statute as the fact that the Village's
treatment of the Olechs was based on something other than the
easement length required of other homeowners. In other words,
the only rational method for determining the Olechs' easement
length was comparing it to the easement lengths of other home-
owners. Because the Village treated the Olechs differently than
others with respect to easement length, the Village had violated
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court confirmed this reading of
Olech through its analysis of another prior case, Allegheny Pitts-
burgh. As described by the Engquist Court, the flaw in the gov-
ernment's action in Allegheny Pittsburgh was to make a market
valuation decision on the basis of a standard that was not "of the
sort on which appraisers often rely.""22 Again, the Court implied
that there was only one rational method of classification (in this
case, typical appraisal criteria); it therefore equated a deviation
from a clear standard with making a classification that is not ra-
tionally related to its purpose.
217. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 749 (7th Cir. 2012); Fortress
Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 222 (2d Cir. 2012); Analytical Diagnostic Labs, Inc.
v. Kusel, 626 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir. 2010).
218. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, supra note 157, at 398, 428.
219. See Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008).
220. Id. at 603 (citing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336,
338-42 (1989)).
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In contrast to Olech and Allegheny Pittsburgh, the Court held
that the decision to fire Engquist was not a deviation from a clear
standard because employment determinations are based on "sub-
jective, individualized determinations" and, therefore, discretion-
ary."' As discretionary decisions, they are outside the scope of the
class-of-one theory of equal protection.222 In light of its rendering
of Olech and Allegheny Pittsburgh, Engquist most likely means
that, if a decision is discretionary, it is not a deviation from a
clear standard and, therefore, necessarily rationally related to a
legitimate goal.
The fact that discretionary activity is now presumed rational is
the key to understanding why the class of one theory is unable to
restrain special legislation. Although there may be a number of
legitimate definitions of discretionary activity, legislation falls
within the discretion of Congress and, therefore, outside the pur-
view of the class-of-one theory of equal protection. The power to
legislate, including the power to refrain from legislating, is con-
signed to the legislature; in the case of federal legislation, the
power is granted to Congress by the Constitution."2 When Con-
gress legislates, it is free to take any course within a wide range
of permissible alternatives. That is, as long as it does not other-
wise violate the Constitution, Congress may legislate on any sub-
ject it chooses. Moreover, because the courts may not force Con-
gress to legislate,"4 Congress may choose to pass no law at all.
Put simply, Congress has discretion over legislation because it is
the job of the legislature to enact, or not enact, legislation. In the
sense of the word as used by the Court in Engquist, the legisla-
ture has discretion over legislation because the legislature is enti-
tled to "take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of
the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind ...
neglecting the others.""22 For this reason, even the classic example
of special legislation, the legislature's decision to accord benefits
to one person but not others, is discretionary. Because the Court
221. Id. at 602.
222. Id.
223. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see also Michael J. Teter, Letting Congress Vote: Judicial
Review of Arbitrary Legislative Inaction, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2014).
224. Carlos M. Vdzquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1082, 1126 n.164 (1992) (explaining that a "claim against Congress seeking to
force it to implement a treaty would face insuperable justiciability problems"); cf. 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(1) (2012) (permitting judicial review of agency failure to act).
225. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
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limited the class-of-one theory to non-discretionary activities, the
legislature's decision to enact special legislation is outside the
purview of a class-of-one equal protection claim.
Moreover, Engquist suggests that a decision can at once be ar-
bitrary and discretionary. As noted, a discretionary action is out-
side the scope of the class-of-one doctrine. This significantly lim-
its the force of Olech, which promised that government action
taken for no reason at all would be considered arbitrary, and thus
in violation of the class-of-one theory of equal protection. After
Engquist, however, government action taken without an accom-
panying reason, although still arbitrary, is now considered discre-
tionary and, therefore, outside the scope of the class-of-one doc-
226trine.
Second, Olech's innovation was its recognition of the class-of-
one doctrine in the equal protection context. But, before Olech,
the Court long had wrestled with the concept of the class of one in
other doctrinal areas. Evaluating Olech and Engquist in light of
these other cases suggests that Olech is the aberration; Engquist,
rather than being an anomaly, is best thought of as bringing the
class-of-one theory back in line with modern pre-Olech doctrine.
The Court's most explicit recognition and rejection of a class-of-
one argument is Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,"' in
which the Court considered a federal statute targeting the infa-
mous Nixon White House tapes. In light of the "long national
nightmare""22 bookended by the Watergate break-in and the res-
ignation of Richard Nixon, Congress passed a statute that or-
dered the Administrator of General Services to take possession of
all White House tape recordings made by President Nixon.2 29 Nix-
on was specifically named in the statute, along with a specific
agreement between the former President and the Administrator
of General Services that described the scope of materials that
would be transferred to the government.23' The Court acknowl-
226. The presumption that a classification decision was made on a rational basis might
be defeated if the government official's stated reason was to discriminate based on a sus-
pect trait.
227. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
228. Speech of Gerald Ford, Swearing in Ceremony (Aug. 9, 1974), in JAMES CANNON,
GERALD R. FORD: AN HONORABLE LiFE 10 (2013).
229. Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93-526, 88 Stat.
1695 (1974).
230. Id.
231. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 431-33.
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edged that Congress had created a "class of one" by targeting
Nixon; nevertheless, the Court upheld the statute because Con-
gress had the legitimate objective of preserving presidential ma-
terials at risk of loss.232 The specification of former President Nix-
on, therefore, created a "legitimate class of one" because the law
could be "rationally understood" as an "act of nonpunitive legisla-
tive policymaking."23
Since Nixon, the Court has continued to affirm that the legisla-
ture has broad authority to single out a class of one for special
treatment. In Plaut v. Spendrift Farm, the Court expressed skep-
ticism about the notion, suggested by Justice Breyer in his con-
currence, that "there is something wrong with particularized leg-
islative action," noting that although "legislatures usually act
through laws of general applicability, that is by no means their
only legitimate mode of action."'234 Even laws that single out an
individual natural person or corporation, the Court held, "are not
on that account invalid." '235 Similarly, in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, although it recognized that the pro-
vision "granted a special benefit to a single litigant in a pending"
236
case.
When considered in light of these other modern class-of-one
cases, Olech appears to be only an evanescent departure from
standard class-of-one doctrine. Engquist's narrow reading of the
class-of-one theory is consistent with class-of-one doctrine from
outside the context of equal protection and reflects the Court's
skepticism of the proposition that there is something wrong with
particularized legislative action. The broken promise of the class-
of-one theory, moreover, is consistent with the Court's retrench-
ment on class legislation, the Court's other abortive attempt to
provide a meaningful check on particularized legislation outside
of the context of suspect traits and fundamental rights. At one
time, either the class legislation doctrine or the class-of-one theo-
ry might have served as a doctrinal basis for restraining special
legislation under the Equal Protection Clause. Modern doctrine
232. Id. at 472.
233. Id. at 472, 477 (emphasis added).
234. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 239 n.9 (1995).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 266 (citing Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 258 (1994) ("The par-
ties agree that § 402(b) [of the Civil Rights Act of 1991] was intended to exempt a single
disparate impact lawsuit against the Wards Cove Packing Company.").
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makes that impossible. As a result, the Equal Protection Clause
cannot meaningfully restrict special legislation without serious
modification to current equal protection doctrine.
In conclusion, an analysis of equal protection doctrine reveals
that it cannot curtail special legislation in a meaningful way.
Most significantly, it is unable to address special benefits, which
make up the bulk of special legislation. The Court's attempt to
address unequal benefits through the Equal Protection Clause,
the class legislation doctrine, foundered on the difficulty of de-
termining when two classes that are treated differently are "simi-
larly situated" and when an unequal benefit can be viewed as
serving a public purpose. In addition, equal protection doctrine
has been unable to address special legislation related to economic
and social legislation, whether it provides benefits or imposes
burdens. Moreover, equal protection doctrine is unable to curtail
special legislation because the enactment of legislation is discre-
tionary in nature. By contrast, equal protection doctrine appears
somewhat better suited to curtail special legislative burdens. Alt-
hough it has not articulated a guiding principle behind its ration-
al basis with bite doctrine, a "bite" based on animus could re-
strain some targeted legislative burdens like the Elizabeth
Morgan Act. These limitations, although significant, suggest
some ways in which equal protection doctrine resonates with a
value of legislative generality. Even though doctrinal limitations
prevent the Equal Protection Clause, alone, from curtailing spe-
cial legislation, it can be read as a part of a value of legislative
generality that can meaningfully limit special legislation. The
contribution of equal protection doctrine to a value of legislative
generality is explored in Part IV.
B. The Equal Protection Clause Is Conceptually Unsuited to
Curtail Special Legislation
Modern equal protection doctrine does not provide a mecha-
nism for restraining most forms of special legislation. But, as de-
scribed above,237 equal protection theory is broader than current
doctrine, suggesting that equal protection has the potential to
play a more prominent role in the elimination of special legisla-
tion. In particular, the history of the development of equal protec-
237. See, e.g., Part II.
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tion theory suggests that modern equal protection doctrine's in-
quiry into the legitimacy of the state's interest has its origin in a
search for a public purpose."' The search for a public purpose, in
turn, is closely associated with the antebellum doctrine of vested
rights, which suggested that special laws were rarely if ever justi-
fied because they were enacted to serve private interests rather
than a public purpose.23 9 The class legislation principle once en-
forced under the Fourteenth Amendment is an intellectual com-
patriot of-though not identical with24 -- this version of a vested
rights principle.241
The intellectual history of the development of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, including the theoretical overlap between vested
rights theory, class legislation, and special legislation, is an im-
portant topic that merits significant attention. It is only for rea-
sons of space, therefore, that this article omits an inquiry into the
history, including the intellectual history, of the Equal Protection
Clause. But, even assuming that there is a theoretical connection
between class legislation and special legislation, because of the
way that equal protection theory has developed, there are signifi-
cant conceptual difficulties that preclude reliance on equal pro-
tection theory to limit special legislation. First, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause cannot be used to address special legislation without
leading to over-enforcement or incoherence. Second, a class in-
cluding only a single person cannot properly be considered a class
within the meaning of equal protection theory.
238. Saunders, supra note 89, at 332.
239. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH.
L. REV. 247, 256-58 (1914); Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process
Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 423-24 (2010). A special thanks to Professor Jack Balkin for
suggesting this line of inquiry.
240. The definition of "class legislation" is notoriously difficult to pin down. Whether at
the time of the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment class legislation encompassed "spe-
cial legislation" is an open question that is beyond the scope of this article. There is strong
evidence that, at the time of the framing of the original Constitution, special legislation
and class legislation were considered distinct phenomena. For example, the highly influ-
ential Blackstone ardently endorsed the paradigm of class legislation-special social, polit-
ical, and legal prerogatives of the nobility-while strongly criticizing particularized legis-
lation. Compare 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20 at *44 with id. at *389-90. Similarly, the
most avid proponents of particularized legislation during the revolutionary period roundly
criticized class legislation. Compare Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note
13, at 661-68 with WOOD, supra note 83, at 399, 422, 482, 553-54.
241. Williams, supra note 239, at 476.
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1. The Equal Protection Clause Cannot Address Special
Legislation Both Effectively and Coherently
Because the executive and judicial functions permit-even re-
quire-specification in some circumstances, the Equal Protection
Clause cannot meaningfully restrict legislative specification with-
out making equal protection jurisprudence hopelessly incoherent.
If the Court were to read the Equal Protection Clause to restrain
special legislation, it would have to choose among the unenviable
options of over-enforcement of generality, incoherence, or lack of
administrability.
First, the Court could enforce a value of generality against not
only the legislature, but also the executive and the judiciary. This
option would have the benefit of offering meaningful judicial re-
view over special legislation. It also would have the benefit of co-
herence. Applying the Equal Protection Clause equally to all
three branches makes sense out of the text of the Constitution,
which does not distinguish among the branches of government. It
also would comport with the Court's repeated affirmations that
the Clause applies to the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches alike.242 However, applying a broad generality principle
to all branches of government would prohibit specification in the
executive and judicial context that is permitted, and even re-
quired, by the Constitution.
Many discretionary executive branch functions call for particu-
larized action."' For example, the Constitution vests the Presi-
dent with the "Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States."4 ' The President may exercise this
power to select an individual for specialized treatment-pardon-
that is not available to others convicted of the same crime. In-
deed, as the Court has described, the "very essence of the pardon-
ing power is to treat each case individually." ' 5 Like the Presi-
dent's power to pardon, discretionary decisions taken by members
of the executive branch are, by necessity, particularized. A prose-
cutor must decide who to charge with a crime and what charges
242. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 58 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
243. E.g., H.L.A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV. 652, 655 (2013).
244. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
245. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 265 (1974).
2017]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
to bring before a grand jury.2 4 Prosecutorial discretion entails the
power to decline to prosecute as well; a prosecutor therefore may
choose whether or not "to grant immunity, accept a plea bargain,
[or] dismiss charges.'2 47 Each of these decisions requires a prose-
cutor to evaluate the merits of an individual case and make a
particularized decision about how to deploy his discretionary du-
ties.24 In a host of civil contexts, too, administrative agencies
make individualized decisions: agencies grant licenses, make hir-
ing and firing decisions, and purchase goods and services. Each of
these powers requires particularized agency action: a license is
granted to an individual company; particular employees are in-
terviewed, hired, and, occasionally, dismissed; and agencies enter
into purchase agreements for computers and conference tables. 29
Similarly, the nature of judicial work necessitates particular-
ized decision making. Courts resolve disputes between individual
litigants. In federal court, this is not merely descriptive, it is part
of what it means to be a federal court. Through the "case or con-
troversy" requirement of Article III, the Constitution ensures that
federal courts resolve only actual disputes between adverse liti-
gants."' Even in state courts, unbound by Article III, the para-
digm of judicial work is particularized action. The core functions
of courts include sentencing individuals to imprisonment, render-
ing money judgments in favor of individuals, and enjoining indi-
vidual litigants from taking action.'
Because the nature of executive and judicial functions require
specification, it would make little sense, and indeed it would be
constitutionally impermissible in some cases, to enforce a value of
246. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978).
247. Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: Origins
and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 6 (2009).
248. Bennett L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Decisionmaking and Discretion in the Charg-
ing Function, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1259, 1266 (2011). Prosecutorial discretion applies to civil
agency action as well as criminal prosecution. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831
(1985).
249. See, e.g., Heckler, 470 U.S. at 839 (Brennan, J., concurring) (recognizing agency
enforcement discretion).
250. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,
341-42 (2006).
251. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cole, 10 N.E.3d 1081, 1089 (Mass. 2014) ("At the core
of the judicial function is the power to impose a sentence."); Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State,
772 S.W.2d 193, 195 (Tex. App. 1989) (stating that a court's authority includes adjudicat-
ing "the rights of person or property between adversaries"); In re Young, 976 P.2d 581, 592
(Utah 1999) (noting that "unquestionably" judicial powers include "sentencing those who
violate the criminal laws" and "entering a money judgment against a person").
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generality against all three branches of government. For exam-
ple, a limitation on special legislation might deny Congress the
power to pardon an individual of a crime."' It would be constitu-
tionally impermissible, however, to deny this power to the Presi-
dent. A limitation on special legislation might prohibit Congress
from granting a sum of money to a named individual; but general-
ity in judicial action-if it prevented a court from entering judg-
ment in favor of a prevailing party-would strike at the heart of
the judicial function. As a result, a reading of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause that enforces generality against all three branches of
government would interfere impermissibly with the functions of
the judicial and executive branches.
Second, the Court could enforce a value of generality against
the legislature but not against the executive and judicial branch-
es. This option would avoid the impermissible outcomes noted
above by allowing executive officials and judges to engage in par-
ticularized decision making. However, an approach to the Equal
Protection Clause that makes its protections depend on the
branch on which it operates would introduce additional incoher-
ence into an already confusing area of the law. The Equal Protec-
tion Clause provides that no state may deprive its citizens of
"equal protection of the laws.""2 ' By its terms, the Clause applies
to all branches of the government without any indication that it
should, or even may, be applied in a way that is fundamentally
different for any branch. Applying a value of generality under the
Equal Protection Clause to one, but not the other branches, would
be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's approach to other con-
stitutional protections, like free speech and due process. In these
contexts, the Court has consistently held that, even when a con-
stitutional prohibition applies on its face only to one branch of
government, it also applies to the other branches.254 A fortiori, be-
cause the Equal Protection Clause facially applies to all branches,
it should also be given this construction. And indeed, the Court
252. Cf. VERMONT REPORT, supra note 76, at 70.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Similarly, the Fifth Amendment's equal protection com-
ponent restrains all branches of the federal government. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.;
Brinkerhoff-Faris Tr. & Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 680 (1930) ("The federal guaranty of
due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative,
executive or administrative branch of government.").
254. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., con-
curring); Boule v. Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 354 (1964); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 165 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see Nicholas Quinn
Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (2010).
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has said as much: more than a century of doctrine confirms that
the Equal Protection Clause operates to constrain all state action,
including "acts by its legislative, executive, and judicial authori-
ties.25 As a result, enforcing a value of generality under the
Equal Protection Clause against the legislature, but not the exec-
utive and judicial branches, is possible only at the expense of in-
troducing additional incoherence into equal protection jurispru-
dence.
Third, the Court could enforce a value of generality against all
three branches, but only to the extent that the government action
can be characterized as legislative. For example, although the leg-
islative power of the United States is formally lodged in Con-
gress,5 the executive branch can be thought of as engaging in
legislative activity when it promulgates administrative rules.257
This distinction between the legislative and non-legislative activi-
ties of agencies finds support in administrative law doctrine. The
Court has held that whether an administrative action requires a
hearing depends in part on whether the result of the action is
general or specific in nature.5 Some lower courts have general-
ized this principle, asserting that "adjudications resolve disputes
among specific individuals in specific cases, whereas rulemaking
affects the rights of broad classes of unspecified individuals."'259
On close inquiry, however, this simple equation of agency
rulemaking with legislative activities proves superficial.2 0 On its
face, the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA") makes no such
distinction. The APA provides that a "rule" is "an agency state-
255. United States v. Stanley, 109 U.S. 3, 58 (1883) (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1948); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879).
As Justice Stevens put it in another context, "[tlhere is only one Equal Protection Clause."
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
256. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
257. RICHARD J. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 294-95 (5th ed.
2009) [hereinafter PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW]. Similarly, the Supreme Court
arguably engages in legislative activity when it writes rules of procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2012). Conversely, some activities conducted by members of the legislative branch are not
legislative activities. For example, each chamber of Congress may pass resolutions, hold
hearings, and judge the qualifications of newly elected members, none of which require the
formalities of bicameralism and presentment. See Zoldan, Congressional Dysfunction, su-
pra note 58, at 636-38. A special thanks to Professor Ganesh Sitaraman for suggesting
this line of inquiry.
258. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445-46 (1915); Lon-
doner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373, 385-86 (1908).
259. Yesler Terrace Cmty. Council v. Cisneros, 37 F.3d 442, 448 (9th Cir. 1994).
260. See, e.g., Ralph F. Fuchs, Procedure in Administrative Rulemaking, 52 HARV. L.
REV. 259, 265 (1938).
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ment of general or particular applicability.., designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy."26' As a result, alt-
hough the statute permits an administrative rule to state gener-
alized principles of policy, a rule may also apply the law to a
particular case. The converse is also true: although an adjudica-
tion customarily resolves a particular dispute, a broadly applica-
ble norm may also be stated in an adjudication.262 As the Supreme
Court has held, an agency is not ordinarily precluded from "an-
nouncing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding," even
when rulemaking was an option available to the agency.262
Additionally, the process of formulating administrative rules
does not resemble the legislative process. In the case of formal
agency proceedings, rulemaking may be accomplished through
procedures, often called trial-type proceedings, which resemble a
judicial trial.264 These procedures come "complete with a full pan-
oply of discovery devices and direct and cross-examination of wit-
nesses by advocates for the parties.""26 As with a federal judicial
trial, formal procedures are presided over by an impartial finder
of fact, who is prohibited from engaging in ex parte communica-
tions, "' and who evaluates witness credibility, rules on eviden-
tiary questions, and must make findings of fact for the record. 267
Like a litigant stating a claim, the proponent of an administrative
rule bears the burden of proof.26 Although the procedures that ac-
company informal rulemaking more closely resemble the process
of lawmaking,269 and are far more common than formal proceed-
ings, neither can they be classified as purely legislative in charac-
ter. Agencies are routinely required by statute to undertake pro-
cedures during the informal rulemaking process that closely
resemble judicial work, including providing a hearing in which an
agency official hears oral testimony, makes evidentiary rulings,
261. 5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012).
262. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294-95 (1974); Qwest Servs. Corp. v.
FCC, 509 F.3d 531, 536 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
263. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 294-95; Qwest Servs., 509 F.3d at 536.
264. 5 U.S.C. § 556-57 (2012); PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 257, at
327-28.
265. E.g., Citizens Awareness Network, Inc. v. United States, 391 F.3d 338, 343 (1st
Cir. 2004).
266. 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (2012); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 516 (1978).
267. Gunderson v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 601 F.3d 1013, 1021 (10th Cir. 2010); First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Fayetteville v. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., 426 F. Supp. 454, 457
(W.D. Ark. 1977).
268. 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2012).
269. PIERCE ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, supra note 257, at 294-95.
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and finds facts.27° Because rules and adjudications are not coex-
tensive with general and particularized agency action, respective-
ly, and because the rulemaking process cannot be fairly charac-
terized as a legislative process, it is conceptually difficult, if not
impossible, to distinguish neatly between legislative and non-
legislative functions of the executive branch. As a result, it would
be difficult to administer a rule of generality that applies only to
legislative activities in the executive branch but not to its non-
legislative activities.
The final option is not to enforce the Equal Protection Clause
in a way that restrains special legislation. This is the option that
the Court has taken, providing very few restraints under the
Equal Protection Clause on particularized legislative action." 1
This option does not have the same problems as the previous
three choices. It allows the Court to enforce the Equal Protection
Clause against all three branches of government without placing
it at irreconcilable odds with the constitutional and institutional
commitments of the other branches. However, this option under-
enforces the value of equality by permitting, unchecked, the pro-
liferation of special legislation. Moreover, as described in Part IV,
this option also fails to recognize that a principle that restricts
special legislation, but not other particularized government ac-
tion, is one of constitutional significance.
2. Special Legislation Cannot Create Classes of Similarly
Situated Individuals
Although special legislation creates classes, it does not create
classes that can be similarly situated; as a result, special legisla-
tion cannot meaningfully be evaluated under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. All statutes classify because all statutes create two
or more groups that are treated differently.272 In order to deter-
mine whether the classification is permissible, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires an evaluation of whether the classes are
"similarly situated," that is, whether the classes that are created
are similar in a way that is relevant to the purpose of the classifi-
cation.2 2 If the two classes are relevantly similar but treated dif-
270. E.g., 15 U.S.C. 57a(c) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 371(e)(3) (2012).
271. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 13, at 640-44.
272. Farrell, Classes, Persons, Equal Protection, supra note 157, at 368-69; Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 72, at 343-44; Zick, supra note 62, at 100.
273. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 72, at 343-45.
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ferently, the classification will run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause unless there is sufficient justification for the disparate
treatment.274 By contrast, if the classes are relevantly different,
then the differential treatment does not violate the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.7 ' This idea is often expressed as "fit." A classification
is a good "fit" with the purpose of a law when it advances the
law's purpose without including too many people in the class that
the purpose excludes, and without excluding too many people
that the purpose includes.276
For example, a statute imposing a drinking age of twenty-one
creates two classes: one that includes all people under the age of
twenty-one and one that includes all other people. Whether the
classification is permissible depends on the legislative purpose of
the classification. In this example, the legislative purpose might
be to enhance traffic safety.217 Based on studies showing that, as
they age, people become more emotionally mature, are better able
to metabolize alcohol, and are better drivers, the legislature may
determine that the class of people under twenty-one and the class
of people twenty-one and older are sufficiently different as to
warrant differential treatment. Under these facts, a court would
likely find that the two classes are not similarly situated and,
therefore, that the legislative classification is lawful. In other
words, there is sufficient "fit" between the purpose of the law and
the classification it makes.7 Even when the legislative purpose is
clear, it can be difficult to determine whether two classes are sim-
ilarly situated. Twenty-five-year-olds may be quite different than
eighteen-year-olds with respect to traffic safety, but the difference
between twenty-year-olds and twenty-one-year-olds is surely
more difficult to discern.2 9 It is this practical difficulty inherent
in Equal Protection analysis, in part, that is responsible for the
Court's deferential stance toward the legislature in the case of
274. See Goldberg, supra note 163, at 510.
275. See HARRIS, supra note 17, at 62.
276. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 72, at 345.
277. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976).
278. See, e.g., Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1382 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (noting that
a "significant increase in alcohol-related traffic accidents and fatalities affecting the 18 to
21 year old group ... supports the finding of a rational basis for a classification comprised
of 18, 19 and 20 year olds").
279. See, e.g., id.
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classifications that do not implicate fundamental rights or sus-
pect traits.
Practical difficulties aside, focusing on fit reveals a significant
conceptual barrier to evaluating special legislation under the
Equal Protection Clause. When a legislature singles out an indi-
vidual for special treatment, the legislature has created two clas-
ses: one that includes a single individual and one that includes
the rest of the world. In most cases, the purpose of the law is
identical to the classification, that is, a person is singled out spe-
cifically to provide him with some unique treatment. Because the
intended scope of the law is coextensive with the class created by
the law, the classification can never be either over- or under-
inclusive. In other words, the class created by a special law will
always be a perfect fit with its purpose because its purpose is to
create a class of one. As a result, the subject of a special law is
never similarly situated to the class of people excluded by it be-
cause the law classifies by the only trait relevant to the special
treatment, to wit, the identity of the target. Because the subject
of a special law can never be similarly situated to the rest of the
population, the Equal Protection Clause cannot be used to review
special laws for lack of fit.
Take, for example, Terri's Law. The legislation created two
classes: one class that included "any parent of Theresa Marie
Schiavo" and one class of everyone else."' The purpose of the leg-
islation was to single out the parents of Terri Schiavo for a spe-
cial benefit not available to the rest of the population."2 The pur-
pose of the legislation, therefore, was a perfect fit with the classes
it created because the law accorded special treatment to the en-
tirety of, and only to, the intended class. As a result, the class of
"any parent of Theresa Marie Schiavo" is not similarly situated to
the other class created by the statute, a class which includes eve-
ryone except "any parent" of Schiavo. As this example illustrates,
because these classes are, by definition, not similarly situated,
there is no place for review of fit under the Equal Protection
Clause for special legislation.
280. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981); Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 72, at 344.
281. Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 109-3, 119
Stat. 15, 15-16 (2005).
282. See id.
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Although review of special legislation under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause allows no room for an analysis of fit, it is still possible
for a court to review a special law for a legitimate purpose.2 3
However, review of legislative purpose-except in the context of
fundamental rights and suspect raits-almost never results in
invalidation of special laws. As noted, review of legislative pur-
pose, when neither a fundamental right nor suspect class is at is-
sue, is minimal. Although the Court has expressed willingness to
look into the actual legislative motivation behind laws that classi-
fy based on a suspect trait, like race, gender, or religion,8 4 when
the subject of the legislation is economic or social, there is virtual-
ly no review of legislative purpose. In a broad, but typical, state-
ment of its review of legislative purpose for economic or social leg-
islation, the Court held that "it is entirely irrelevant for
constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the
challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature .... In
other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-
finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by
evidence or empirical data.""2 5
Scholars have long recognized that the level of deference ac-
corded to economic and social legislation makes the search for a
legitimate purpose tautological. That is, the standard of review
articulated for social and economic legislation permits courts to
hypothesize a legitimate state purpose that comports with the
statute. By hypothesizing a legitimate state purpose that fits the
statute, a court guarantees that the statute, at least in part, ful-
fills a legitimate state purpose. Professor Ely articulated this tau-
tology in the following way:
A decision to aid artists rather than oilmen is defensible in terms of
promoting the arts .... And so is any such choice thus defensible....
Thus each choice will import its own goal, each goal will count as ac-
ceptable, and the requirement of a "rational" choice-goal relation will




283. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40 (1973).
284. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); see also Caleb Nelson,
Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784, 1852 (2008) ("Just as the
judiciary will examine the internal legislative process when litigants accuse legislatures of
racist or sexist motivations that implicate the Equal Protection Clause, modern judges use
a similar approach when litigants accuse legislatures of religious motivations that impli-
cate the Establishment Clause.").
285. FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993); see Norman T. Deutsch,
Nguyen v. INS and the Application of Intermediate Scrutiny to Gender Classifications:
Theory, Practice, and Reality, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 185, 189 (2003).
286. John Hart Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law,
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For this reason, a court cannot find that a special economic or so-
cial law fails for lack of a legitimate state purpose. Consider again
the special transfer of wealth to Lautenberg. Although, as a prac-
tical matter, there seems to be little public purpose to this trans-
fer, it is certainly possible to conceive of a state interest (which is
all that equal protection requires) that would be met by the law.
For example, the transfer to Lautenberg might inform the public
about the high esteem in which we hold our elected officials,
thereby encouraging public service. In this way, any legitimate
state purpose can be imagined when economic or social laws alone
are at stake.
Putting together these insights about the inevitability of fit and
the tautology of rational basis analysis leads to a final and im-
portant conclusion about the ability of equal protection theory to
permit review of special legislation. As noted above, with few ex-
ceptions, all special laws are economic or social in nature and,
therefore, will be reviewed under rational basis.287 Because the
scope of special laws are always a perfect fit with their purpose,
there is no room for judicial review under the Equal Protection
Clause for special laws. In light of these constraints, the scope of
review available under the Equal Protection Clause for special
legislation is not just crabbed-it is vanishingly small.
In conclusion, equal protection theory is largely incompatible
with any meaningful limitation on special legislation. In order to
impose a meaningful restraint on the legislature, the clause
would either have to interfere with the necessarily particularized
functions of the executive and judiciary or apply differently
among the different branches of government. Moreover, the fact
that special economic or social legislation will always be a perfect
fit with its purpose makes scrutiny predicated on fit impossible.
However, these limitations also suggest some ways in which
equal protection theory supports an independent value of legisla-
tive generality. The contribution of equal protection theory to a
value of legislative generality is discussed in Part IV.
79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1247 (1970) [hereinafter Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motiva-
tion].
287. See Part Ill.A.1.
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IV. THE EQUAL PROTECTION COMPONENT OF LEGISLATIVE
GENERALITY
Although the Equal Protection Clause is a powerful tool for en-
forcing equality, it can be considered a failure in one important
respect: the clause's doctrinal commitments and conceptual limi-
tations make it insufficient, on its own, to effectively and coher-
ently curtail the significant inequalities created by special legisla-
tion. Despite this failure, however, the foregoing analysis also
reveals that there are some aspects of the Equal Protection
Clause that resonate with a principle that disfavors laws singling
out individuals for special treatment. This principle may be called
the value of legislative generality. The idea of a value of legisla-
tive generality as a constitutional principle was introduced in
previous work 8 and is summarized briefly below. After summa-
rizing the support for recognizing legislative generality as a con-
stitutional value, the remainder of this Part will use the lessons
learned from analyzing the Equal Protection Clause to help de-
fine more precisely the parameters of the value of legislative gen-
erality.
A. A Summary of the Constitution's Value of Legislative
Generality
A constitutional principle that disfavors targeted legislation
may be called a value of legislative generality. Support for treat-
ing a value of legislative generality as a principle of constitutional
dimension is found in the history of the period leading up to the
framing of the Constitution, the text of the Constitution itself,
and jurisprudential considerations that are reflected in philo-
sophical works and Supreme Court doctrine.288
The history of the period leading up to the framing of the Con-
stitution suggests that the Constitution was framed, in part, to
put an end to the rampant and abusive special legislation enacted
during the period between independence and the framing of the
Constitution. By the close of the confederation period, in their
writings, speeches, and debates, both ordinary and prominent
288. The value of legislative generality briefly described here was described in more
detail in Reviving Legislative Generality. See Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, su-
pra note 13, at 650-60.
289. Id. at 650-51.
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members of the American republics made it clear that they would
no longer tolerate the common legislative practice of enacting
statutes to benefit or burden specific individuals.29 The aversion
to special legislation nurtured during the confederation period is
reflected in a number of clauses of the Constitution. The main
subject of this article, the Equal Protection Clause, is one of these
clauses; others include the Bill of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, Con-
tract, Appointments, Due Process, Takings, and General Welfare
clauses.2"' Although none of these clauses are exclusively about
generality in legislation, each of these clauses suggests the im-
propriety of targeted legislation in certain circumstances. Read
together, they suggest that generality in legislation is a value of
constitutional weight. Finally, there is a long tradition among ju-
rists and philosophers of law that criticizes targeted legislation.
Both Locke and Blackstone argued that a statute affecting a sin-
gle individual was simply not within the definition of the word
"law.""29 A strain of early Supreme Court cases agreed that the
legislative power includes only the power to prescribe general
rules of conduct, not acts affecting only particular individuals.9
Moreover, scholars assessing the normative implications of spe-
cial legislation, like Cicero, David Hume, and Algernon Sidney,
stressed the harm and injustice they caused.294 More modern
scholars, like Lon Fuller and H.L.A. Hart, have also emphasized
the centrality of legislative generality to a legal system.29'
In addition to establishing that the value of legislative general-
ity is a value of constitutional weight, an analysis of the sources
supporting its recognition help define the parameters of the val-
ue. Legislative generality does not mean that every statute must
apply to every person; nor is every narrowly drawn statute neces-
sarily unconstitutional. However, a value of legislative generality
290. Id. at 652.
291. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (General Welfare Clause); id. art. I, §§ 9-10 (Bill of Attain-
der and Ex Post Facto clauses; id. art. I, § 10 (Contract Clause); id. art. II, § 2 (Appoint-
ments Clause); id. amend. V (Takings and Due Process clauses).
292. LOCKE, supra note 19, at chap. XI, § 142; see 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 20, at *44.
293. See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 558 (1819);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136, 138-39 (1810).
294. See ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 454-55 (Thomas
G. West ed., 1990); MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, On the Laws, in ON THE COMMONWEALTH
AND ON THE LAWS 105, 173 (James E.G. Zetzel ed., 1999); DAVID HUME, Of the Rise and
Progress of the Arts and Sciences, in POLITICAL ESSAYS 58, 62-63 (Knud Haakonssen ed.,
1994).
295. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 46-48 (1964); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 20-21 (2d ed. 1994).
[Vol. 51:489
THE EQUAL PROTECTION COMPONENT
would place outer limits on the ability of both state legislatures
and Congress to enact targeted legislation. The history of the
framing period suggests that the core commitments of a value of
legislative generality are the elimination of: legislative grants of
special benefits, like licenses and transfers of property; legislative
imposition of special burdens, like confiscation of property and
deprivation of liberty; interference with civil or criminal judicial
processes for named claimants or defendants; exemptions from
the standing laws for particular cases; and the transfer of proper-
ty from one person to another.296 The history of the framing period
also suggests that laws that prefigure generally applicable laws,
like a law incorporating a particular corporation that also applies
generally to future corporations, is unlikely to trigger legislative
generality's core concerns. Similarly, the value of legislative gen-
erality is less likely to disfavor laws that eliminate, rather than
create, disparities among people, like a law that names an indi-
vidual for the purpose of ensuring similar treatment as others in
a similar situation.297
B. Equal Protection's Contribution to the Value of Legislative
Generality
Determining the precise parameters of a constitutional value of
legislative generality is a long-term project that will require
analysis of each of a number of constitutional clauses and princi-
ples. The analysis conducted in this article contributes to this
project by identifying those features of the Equal Protection
Clause that support the value of legislative generality. This anal-
ysis also suggests some further refinements to the parameters of
legislative generality.
First, modern equal protection doctrine does little to limit spe-
cial benefit legislation; however, a review of earlier, now mori-
bund strains of equal protection doctrine suggests a stronger
commitment to generality. Specifically, some of the Court's class
legislation and class-of-one cases reveal a concern with legislation
that accords unequal benefits as well as unequal burdens. In
Barbier, the Court viewed benefits and burdens as two sides of
the same coin; legislation "discriminating against some and favor-
296. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 13, at 689.
297. Id.
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ing others" was impermissible class legislation.298 Similarly, the
Court reaffirmed in Engquist that the Equal Protection Clause
applies both to "privileges conferred," as well as "liabilities im-
posed."'299 This doctrine suggests that the legislative distribution
of a benefit-like the transfer of wealth to Lautenberg-should be
scrutinized. Although equal protection doctrine's other commit-
ments prevent it from meaningfully curtailing the distribution of
unequal benefits, an independent value of legislative generality
can give effect to this principle. As a result, a value of legislative
generality, properly formulated, should disfavor special benefits
as well as special burdens."'
The major doctrinal challenge to a principle that prevents the
distribution of special benefits is standing, which prohibits a per-
son from challenging a congressional distribution of wealth if the
harm it causes is generalized.0 1 However, as I have argued in
previous work, standing is not fatal to reviving a value of legisla-
tive generality because legislative generality can be seen as a
specific limitation on the taxing and spending power.30 2
Moreover, even to the extent that standing presents a doctrinal
challenge to enforcing a value of legislative generality in court,
the legislature itself has the ability, and indeed the duty, to en-
force constitutional values."0 Professor Paul Brest argued that
judicial deference to the constitutionality of statutes does not re-
lieve members of the legislature from their duty to enact only leg-
islation that comports with the Constitution.0 4 Indeed, as Brest
points out, "some provisions of the Constitution are explicitly ad-
dressed to legislators.' '0 °' Notably, a number of clauses that help
describe a value of legislative generality, like the Bill of Attain-
der, Ex Post Facto, and Title of Nobility clauses, expressly place
298. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27, 32 (1885).
299. Engquist v. Or. Dep't of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008) (quoting Hayes v. Mis-
souri, 120 U.S. 68, 71-72 (1887)).
300. This conclusion is supported by the history of the period leading up to the framing
of the Constitution. During that period, the revolutionary generation rejected the power of
their legislatures to enact all types of special legislation, including the distribution of spe-
cial legislative benefits. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 13, at 689.
301. Id. at 691-92.
302. Id. at 692-93.
303. A special thanks to Professor Akhil Amar for suggesting this line of inquiry.
304. Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585, 586-87 (1975).
305. Id. at 587.
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limitations on the legislative power."6 This suggests that the leg-
islature is duty-bound to consider these provisions as binding,
even if the Court has not enforced or cannot enforce them.3 7 As a
result, even if standing principles preclude courts from giving full
effect to a value of legislative generality, they do not preclude a
"conscientious legislator""3 from enforcing legislative generality
by refusing to vote for bills that target individuals for special
treatment. Doing so will give effect to the principle of legislative
generality reflected in the text of the Constitution, the history
surrounding its ratification, and the jurisprudential considera-
tions that have guided its interpretation.
Second, the Olech Court held that equal protection can restrain
targeted legislation if it is irrational. Olech's class-of-one theory of
equal protection, however, has proved illusory. Demonstrating
that a legislative choice is irrational in the context of economic
and social legislation is nearly impossible because the search for a
choice-goal relation is tautological; that is, a court can always find
a rational connection between an imagined goal and a statutory
directive.9 Consider Terri's Law: the statute was woefully under-
inclusive if its purpose was to save the lives of the thousands of
people thought to be in Schiavo's situation;310 however, if the pur-
pose is imagined more narrowly, to preserve the life of Schiavo
herself,311 then there was a rational connection between Terri's
Law and its purpose.
Although equal protection theory leaves little room for a find-
ing of irrationality, Olech can be given meaning if targeted legis-
lation is measured against the definition of rationality drawn
from behavioral economics."2 Even assuming the legitimacy of its
purpose, a targeted statute, like Terri's Law, might be irrational
because it is an example of the cognitive bias that social scientists
306. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 9-10.
307. Robin West, The Missing Jurisprudence of the Legislated Constitution, in THE
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, at 79, 86 (Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009).
308. Brest, supra note 304, at 587.
309. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation, supra note 286, at 1246-47.
310. 151 CONG. REC. S2926, 2928 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2005) (statements of Sen. Tom
Harkin & Sen. Ron Wyden).
311. This was the stated purpose of the law. 151 CONG. REC. H1700, 1712-13 (daily ed.
Mar. 20, 2005) (statement of Rep. Phil Gingrey). Moreover, even if it was not stated explic-
itly, preserving life is a legitimate state purpose. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
475 (1996) ("States traditionally have had great latitude under their police powers to legis-
late as to the protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons.").
312. A special thanks to Professor Naomi Mezey for suggesting this line of research.
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label the "identifiable victim" effect.313 Research has shown that
an identifiable victim elicits a greater altruistic response than a
hypothetical victim, even when no specific information is given
about the identifiable victim.314 For example, people are more will-
ing to donate to a charitable organization when they are told that
a needy (but undescribed) person "has been selected" by the chari-
ty to receive the donation; they are less willing to donate when
they are told that a needy person "will be selected" to receive the
gift. 315 Moreover, the identifiable victim effect is more pronounced
when the victim is a single identified individual rather than a
group.316 This research suggests that when members of the legis-
lature single out an individual for special treatment, they may be
doing so not because the targeted individual's personal character-
istics warrant differential treatment, but simply because the in-
dividual has been identified. The cognitive bias favoring action
toward an identifiable victim can lead to irrational results within
the meaning of behavioral economics."
Terri's Law can be seen as an example of the "identifiable vic-
tim" effect. Even though members of Congress were aware that
there might be others in Schiavo's situation, Congress focused on
just one identifiable individual. The identifiable victim effect sug-
gests that Congress's decision to pass a statute addressing only
Schiavo's situation may not have been the result of an individual-
ized, rational assessment about the needs of her case, but rather
because of an irrational bias that favors particularized action
over generalized action. In other words, Terri's Law was not
merely under-inclusive because it was convenient or practical for
Congress to address part of a problem; rather, Congress's decision
may have been irrationally motivated because she was identified
as a particular person in need. The identifiable victim effect,
moreover, can be considered a subset of the "determined other ef-
fect," a cognitive bias by which "any determined target evokes a
313. See generally Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, Helping a Victim or Help-
ing the Victim: Altruism and Identifiability, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 (2003); see also
Donald A. Redelmeier & Amos Tversky, Discrepancy Between Medical Decisions for Indi-
vidual Patients and for Groups, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1162, 1162-64 (1990). A special
thanks to Professor Deborah Small for her insights on the identifiable victim effect.
314. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 313, at 7.
315. Id. at 11-12.
316. Kogut & Ritov, supra note 139, at 164-65.
317. Id. at 164.
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stronger emotional reaction than an undetermined target."'318 This
effect likely explains some targeted laws that punish rather than
benefit, like the Elizabeth Morgan Act, in which Congress target-
ed one person accused of a heinous crime.
The identifiable victim effect and, more generally, the deter-
mined other effect, suggest two conclusions that help refine the
value of legislative generality. One, because targeted legislation,
either beneficial or burdensome, might be the product of cognitive
bias, a value of legislative generality should prevent targeted leg-
islation even if the class-of-one theory has been fatally wounded
after Engquist. By doing so, a value of legislative generality will
give effect to the impulse in Olech that targeted legislation can
indeed be irrational even in the context of economic or social leg-
islation. Two, the fact that the identifiable victim effect is strong-
est when a single victim rather than a small group is identified
provides support for including, at the very least, legislation that
targets an individual in the definition of special legislation. These
statutes are most likely to reflect irrational legislative decisions.
Third, the conceptual and doctrinal limitations of the Equal
Protection Clause suggest that a value of legislative generality
should be concerned with legislative action rather than executive
or judicial action. The Court has struggled to articulate a value of
legislative generality in large part because it has not been able to
distinguish between particularized legislative action and particu-
larized action of the other branches. As its class-of-one cases re-
veal, the Court does not distinguish between particularized exec-
utive action (like Engquist's administrative employment decision)
and particularized legislative action (like Nixon's targeted legisla-
tion). The inability to distinguish between legislative and non-
legislative action has made it difficult for the Court to give effect
to a value of legislative generality because of the practical and
constitutional impossibility of enforcing generality over executive
and judicial functions.319 Nevertheless, the Court's class-of-one
and administrative law cases reveal that the Court is troubled by
specificity in certain circumstances. A value of legislative general-
ity that applies only to the legislative branch can provide a better
mechanism than current doctrine for giving effect to the Court's
318. Small & Loewenstein, supra note 313, at 14.
319. Moreover, administrative law's distinction between the legislative functions and
non-legislative functions of administrative agencies is superficial because both rules and
adjudications can be general and specific in scope.
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concerns about specificity. By focusing on the legislative branch
only, a value of legislative generality avoids the definitional prob-
lems that plague administrative law's distinction between rule-
making and adjudication. A value of legislative generality that fo-
cuses on the legislative branch also avoids the problems
associated with over-enforcement of generality in the executive
and judicial branches. Finally, a value of legislative generality
makes sense of the distinction between the role of the legislature
and the role of the other branches. As the Court held in Fletcher,
"[ilt is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general
rules for the government of society; the application of those rules
to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other de-
partments .20
CONCLUSION
Special legislation has long been a flaw in the edifice of equali-
ty. Often enacted without publicity or objection, special legisla-
tion quietly transfers assets to favored members of society or ex-
empts them from the standing laws, or burdens individuals who
have done no wrong but to offend popular sensibilities. Despite
the pervasive inequality that special legislation creates, it cannot
be constrained by the most powerful tool for equality written into
the Constitution, the Equal Protection Clause. Because of the
way that equal protection doctrine has developed and the com-
mitments of the Clause to suspect classes and fundamental
rights, the Equal Protection Clause is an insufficient constitu-
tional tool to restrain special legislation and the inequality that it
creates.
But, our traditional reliance on the Equal Protection Clause to
enforce equality should not blind us to the value of legislative
generality, an under-enforced principle of constitutional weight
with the potential to restrain special legislation currently un-
checked by the Equal Protection Clause. Because a value of legis-
lative generality finds support in the text of the Constitution, the
historical experiences of the generation that framed it, and the
philosophical traditions that inform its provisions, it has the ca-
pability of limiting special legislation in a coherent and meaning-
ful way.
320. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (emphasis added); see also Trs.
of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 558 (1819).
[Vol. 51:489
2017]. THE EQUAL PROTECTION COMPONENT
Even outside of its elimination of special legislation, recogniz-
ing legislative generality as a value of constitutional weight
serves an important role in our constitutional jurisprudence. It
makes sense out of under-enforced, but doubtlessly important,
clauses of the Constitution, like the Bill of Attainder, Title of No-
bility, and Ex Post Facto Clauses. It gives meaning to the experi-
ences of the members of the generation that framed the Constitu-
tion. It also places our constitutional protections squarely in line
with a number of philosophical traditions, modern and ancient
alike, that recognize the inequity of special privileges and bur-
dens. In this way, the value of legislative generality does more
than pick up where the Equal Protection Clause leaves off; ra-
ther, it helps define the uncertain but crucial boundary between
the will of the majority and the autonomy of the individual. It is
this line-separating the sphere of democracy from a space that is
kept safe from democracy's failings-that is the essence and
strength of a constitutional republic.

